State of Utah v. Luis Mirio Ceron : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
State of Utah v. Luis Mirio Ceron : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald S. Fujino; counsel for appellee.
Laura B. Dupaix; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Aaron W. Flater;
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; counsel for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation




UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Luis Mirio Ceron, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellant 
State's Appeal from the Pretrial Dismissal of Charges for Attempted 
Murder and Aggravated Kidnapping, First Degree Felonies, i i the 
Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Ann Boy den presiding 
LAURA B. DUPAIX (5195) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
4764 South 900 East, Ste 2 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Counsel for Anuellee 
AARON W.FLATCU 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
Counsel for Auoellant 
Oral Argument Requested 
FH-ED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 2 9 2010 
Case No. 20090489-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Luis Mirio Ceron, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellant 
State's Appeal from the Pretrial Dismissal of Charges for Attempted 
Murder and Aggravated Kidnapping, First Degree Felonies, in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Ann Boy den presiding 
LAURA B. DUPAIX (5195) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
4764 South 900 East, Ste 2 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Counsel for Appellee 
AARON W. FLATER 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
Counsel for Appellant 
Oral Argument Requested 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 18 
ARGUMENT 20 
BRICKEY DOES NOT PRECLUDE REFILING A FELONY 
INFORMATION, WHERE THE PRIOR DISMISSAL WAS NOT BASED 
ON A LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND WHERE NO EVIDENCE 
SUGGESTED A POTENTIAL ABUSIVE PRACTICE 20 
A. Brickey's presumptive bar against refiling applies only when the 
original charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause and 
when due process is implicated by a potential abusive practice 21 
B. Brickey's presumptive bar against refiling does not apply when the 
original charges were dismissed based on the prosecutor's inability 
to proceed and no evidence suggests a potential abusive practice 25 
C. Brickey did not bar refiling in this case because the original charges 
were dismissed for the prosecutor's inability to proceed and no 




Addendum A: Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
Addendum B: January 15, 2009 Hearing Transcript 
Addendum C: February 26, 2009 Hearing Transcript 
Addendum D: April 2, 2009 Hearing Transcript 
Addendum E: April 23, 2009 Brickey Hearing Transcript 
Addendum F: Magistrate's Order of Dismissal 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Browning v. State, 648 P.2d 1261 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) 26, 27, 29 
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) 23, 26 
Lampe v. State, 540 P.2d 590 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) 27, 30 
Martinez v. State, 569 P.2d 497 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) 27, 30 
Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1996) 35 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980) 21 
State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, 89 P.3d 191 passim 
State v. Bolen, 13 P.3d 1270 (Kan. 2000) 35 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) passim 
State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767 passim 
State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113,37 P.3d 1160 24, 30, 31 
State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85,151 P.3d 171 21, 24, 25 
State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 218 P.3d 590 15 
State v. Zahn, 2008 UT App 56,180 P.3d 186 24, 25 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code § 78A-4-103 (2008) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2008) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West Supp. 2008) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2009) 1 
i i i 
Utah Const, art. 1 §12 15 
STATE RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 1102 15 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7 21, 24 
UtahR.Crim.P.25 35 
IV 
Case No. 20090489-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Luis Mirio Ceron, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State of Utah appeals the pretrial dismissal with prejudice of one count 
each of attempted murder and aggravated kidnapping, both first degree felonies. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009) 
(pour-over provision). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Does State v. Brickey preclude refiling a felony information, where the prior 
dismissal was not based on a lack of probable cause and where no evidence 
suggested a potential abusive practice by the prosecutor? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's interpretation of case law is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, % 1, 34 P.3d 767. 
Preservation: The State preserved this issue in its oral argument opposing the 
motion to dismiss. See T09:11:15-26. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant rule is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 25 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
On October 7, 2008, Pacheco-Ortega and his co-defendant Luis Ceron were 
charged by information with one count of attempted murder with injury, in 
Because this is an appeal from the dismissal of a refiled information, the 
record consists of pleadings files and transcripts from two different numbered 
prosecutions: Case No. 081907681 (original case) and Case No. 091902779 (refiled 
case). This brief will cite to the pleadings file with an "R" followed by the first two 
digits of the applicable district court case number, a colon, and the record page. 
E.g., R08:l-3; R09:32. Citations to the transcripts will begin with a "T" followed by 
the first two digits of the applicable district court case number, a colon, the record 
number of the transcript, another colon, and the internal page number of the 
transcript. E.g., T08:25:10; T09:ll:26. 
However, the joint January 15, 2009 preliminary hearing transcript was 
inadvertently not included in Ceron7s appellate record, although the State requested 
that it be included. But two copies of that hearing are included in Pacheco-Ortega's 
appellate record, Case No. 20090488-CA. The State is moving contemporaneously 
with the filing of this brief to consolidate the two appeals for purposes of argument 
and decision. The January 15, 2009 transcript is attached as Addendum B to this 
brief for the convenience of counsel and the Court. Because that transcript has not 
been assigned a record number in Ceron's appeal, this brief will cite to that 
transcript as Add. B, followed by the internal page number. 
2 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (West Supp. 2008), and one count of 
aggravated kidnapping, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West Supp. 
2008), first degree felonies. R08:l-5; R09:l-3. After a failed attempted resolution, the 
district court set a preliminary hearing date for January 15, 2009. R08:20-21. 
The preliminary hearing was continued twice on the parties' agreement so 
that the victim/witness, who had an outstanding warrant, could obtain and consult 
with his own counsel. R08:40-41, 51-52; Add. B:4-6; T08:25:3-5. At the third 
preliminary hearing setting on April 2, 2009, the magistrate dismissed the case 
against both defendants without prejudice, because the victim/witness—for the first 
time—failed to appear. T08:26:4-5, 8,10-11. 
The State refiled the cases against both defendants later that day. R09:01. 
Pacheco-Ortega moved to quash the refiled information on the ground that it was 
refiled in violation of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Ceron later joined 
Pacheco-Ortega's motion at the hearing on the motion. T09:ll:2. On May 26, 2009, 
the magistrate entered an order dismissing the refiled information in both cases 
with prejudice because "in re-filing this case the State violated the standards 
3 
articulated in State v. Brickey[.]" R09:9. The State timely appealed from both 
dismissals.2 R09:12. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tlie crimes3 
On October 1, 2008, Michael Fleming went to Luis Ceron's business to 
complete a drug deal. R09:2-3. Pacheco-Ortega, Ceron, and twin juveniles beat, 
kicked, tasered, bound, and threatened Fleming with gams. R09:2-3; T09:ll:15. 
Ceron shoved a gun down Fleming's throat and "announced in some detail how 
[he] was going to die." R09:3; T09:ll:15. Fleming passed out. T09:ll:15. A rag 
shoved into Fleming's mouth was secured by duct tape. T09:ll:15. A "severely 
injured" Fleming was then stuffed into the trunk of a car, "while he listened to his 
attackers planning the best way to kill him and dispose of his body." R09:3; 
T09:ll:15. 
2
 As stated in footnote 1, the State is filing a contemporaneous motion to 
consolidate this and Pacheco-Ortega's appeal for purposes of argument and 
decision. 
3The alleged facts are taken from the probable cause statement of the 
information and the prosecutor's proffered facts in the motion to dismiss hearing. 
Because neither Pacheco-Ortega nor Ceron have been tried, the presumption of 
innocence applies. 
4 
Based on "credible information," several police officers "made a SWAT entry 
to preserve life" into Ceron's business. R09:3. The officers found Pacheco-Ortega, 
Ceron, and the two juveniles there. R09:3; T09;ll:15. Pacheco-Ortega7s sleeves were 
covered in blood. R09:3. 
The officers rescued Fleming from the trunk of the car and, realizing that he 
had been severely beaten, arranged for emergency medical care. R09:3; T09:ll:15. A 
warrant search of Ceron's business yielded a bloody pipe, bloody rags, duct tape, a 
bag containing a handgun with blood on the barrel, and several bags of cocaine, 
heroin, and methamphetamine. R09:3. 
Fleming gave the officers a statement implicating the defendants. R09:2-3; 
T09:ll:15. 
The parties twice stipulate to continue the preliminai^y hearing4 
After a failed resolution hearing, the cases were set for preliminary hearing on 
January 15, 2009. R08:20-21. Both defendants, their counsel, and the State's two 
witnesses—a police officer and Fleming—appeared. Add B:3-6. The State was 
ready to proceed until Pacheco-Ortega's attorney noted that Fleming had his own 
pending felony charges and, therefore, should have an opportunity to consult with 
4
 The complete transcripts of the two hearings are attached as Addendum B 
(January 15, 2009), and Addendum C (February 26, 2009). 
5 
counsel before testifying. See Add B:4-6; T08:26:6-7. The parties therefore stipulated 
that the preliminary hearing should be continued. Add B:4-6. Pacheco-Ortega's 
attorney viewed the continuance as necessary because, otherwise, Fleming "will be 
questioned and probably end up invoking the Fifth." Add B:5. The preliminary 
hearing was continued to February 26, 2009. R08:41; Add B:6. 
At the February 26, 2009 setting, the prosecution's two witnesses, including 
Fleming, were again present and the prosecutor was again ready to proceed. See 
T08:25:3-5. Newly-appointed counsel for Fleming was also present. T08:25:3-5. But 
the parties agreed that the preliminary hearing needed to be continued again 
because Fleming's counsel had been appointed only the day before and wanted 
more time to consult with Fleming. T08:25:3-4. Pacheco-Ortega's attorney 
explained that until the day before, Fleming had been represented by the same 
public defender office as Pacheco-Ortega and that LDA had had to "scramble[] 
around to get conflict counsel assigned" to Fleming. T08:25:4-5, 8-9. Pacheco-
Ortega's attorney further represented that both he and the prosecutor had made 
their "best efforts" to be ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing, but "that's 
simply not going to happen in light of the recently appointed conflict lawyer." 
T08:25:4-5. 
6 
On the parties7 agreement, the preliminary hearing was rescheduled for April 
2,2009. T08:25:5. Pacheco-Ortega7 s attorney stated that while Pacheco-Ortega was 
not waiving his speedy trial rights, the defense recognized that "the circumstances 
mandate this continuance and there's nothing we can do about it/7 T08:25:6. 
Moreover, Pacheco-Ortega was not eligible for release because an ICE hold had been 
placed on him. T08:25:6. 
Ceron7s attorney agreed the hearing should be continued, but asked that the 
magistrate consider a reduction in Ceron's $100,000 bond. T08:25:3-14. He 
acknowledged that Ceron, a U.S. citizen, had pending federal charges and was 
subject to a federal no-bail hold, but opined that the no-bail hold was "in part 
because of concern about state charges.77 T08:25 9-10. Ceron7s attorney hoped that a 
significant reduction in bail might give "the feds some basis to reconsider [Ceron7s] 
hold under the federal system/7 and allow him pretrial release. T08:25:10. Based on 
the seriousness of the state charges, the magistrate declined to reduce bail. 
The magistrate concluded the hearing, however, by stating, "We are all on the 
same page and also with everything being reflected on today's hearing, even if there 
are problems that arise, the hearing needs to go forward on April 2 or there will be 
considerable rethinking of what's happening.77 T08:25:14. 
7 
Because Fleming was then in custody, the prosecutor stated that he would file 
a motion to transport him to the next preliminary hearing, T08:25:5, 8,14. 
April 2, 2009 hearing5 
At the April 2, 2009 setting, the prosecutor stated that he was unable to 
proceed because "an essential witness," Michael Fleming, was not present.6 
T08:26:4. The prosecutor explained that he had learned, only the day before, that his 
transportation order could not be honored because, unbeknownst to him, Fleming 
had been released from custody. T08:26:4-5; T09:ll:18. The prosecutor had 
unsuccessfully tried the day before the hearing to contact Fleming through his 
counsel. T08:26:5. (Fleming's counsel was present at the April 2 hearing. T08:26:5). 
The prosecutor had also attempted personal sendee that morning, but Fleming had 
failed to appear at a scheduled presentence interview with AP&P. T08:26:4. An 
investigator, who had previously communicated with Fleming, had also been 
unable to contact him. T08:26:4-5. 
The prosecutor asked for a continuance "because of this unavailable witness." 
The prosecutor noted that although the State had had "success in tracking [Fleming] 
5
 The complete transcript of the April 2, 2009 hearing is attached as 
Addendum D. 
6
 This was the first time this prosecutor had appeared on the case. T09:ll:4-5, 
16-17. 
8 
down in the past/' it was unable to "find him for this preliminary hearing" on such 
short notice. T08:26:5. 
Both defendants for the first time objected to the continuance. T08:26:5-7. 
Ceron's attorney moved for dismissal, arguing that the pending charges were 
adversely affecting Ceron's ability to get pretrial release on his federal charges. 
T08:26:5-6. Alternatively, Ceron asked for "straight release" on the state charges. 
T08:26:6. Pacheco-Ortega likewise moved for dismissal, but "without prejudice with 
the right of the State to refile were they to find Mr. Fleming." T08:26:6. 
The magistrate confirmed with the prosecutor that Fleming was "not only the 
key material witness," but also "the victim." T08:26:7. After noting the seriousness 
of the allegations—"the beating and the tasering and the putting the gun in the 
mouth"—the magistrate dismissed both cases without prejudice. T08:26:7-9. And 
"given the nature of these offenses," the magistrate declined "to restrict the State in 
any refiling, from doing it by warrant." T08:26:8-9. 
The prosecutor asked the magistrate to stay the order of dismissal until 5:00 
p.m. that day. T08:26:9. Anticipating a dismissal when he could not locate Fleming, 
the prosecutor explained that he planned to refile both cases immediately. T08:26:9-
10. Both defendants objected to a stay and argued that absent evidence of Fleming's 
cooperation, refiling "would be inappropriate." T08:26:10. 
9 
That magistrate replied, "that is the basis of my ruling," but declined to place 
any restrictions on when the State could refile, because the magistrate was "not in a 
position" to make that determination: 
I'm not going to make any restrictions about when the State can refile 
because I'm not in a position to be reviewing that. The prosecution 
knows the law, knows the case law that applies and knows statutes 
and rules that apply that you can refile, but only under certain 
circumstances and given the underlying basis of why I'm granting the 
Motion to Dismiss is in fact Mr. Fleming's non-appearance today . . . . 
T08:26:10-ll. The magistrate reiterated that it was not restricting when the State 
could refile, leaving it up to the State to determine whether it could in "good faith" 
"go forward" and "have the presence of the essential witness": 
I simply am not going to make any orders that would say that if that's 
refiled again by 5:00 because then that's putting pressure on the refiling 
and without taking into consideration that you still don't have that 
witness. If that changes and you do and the State feels like it can go 
ahead and refile this case in full good faith, that you can go forward 
and in good faith think you will have the presence of the essential 
witness and that all occurs by 5:00, then that's pretty good. 
T08:26:10-ll. The magistrate repeated a third time that it was not restricting the 
timing of a refiling: "I'm not restricting that refiling but it does need to be fully and 
10 
1 
completely meeting all of the requirements the State needs to do to refile." 
T08:26:ll. 
Refiling 
The prosecutor refiled the charges against both defendants the same day, after 
learning that his investigator had talked to Fleming's out-of-state mother. R08:67; 
R091-2; T09:ll:18-19. The mother reported that she had been in contact with 
Fleming and confirmed that he was in the Salt Lake area. T09:ll:19. She expected to 
hear from him shortly because he needed to borrow money from her. T09:ll:19. 
She promised to let Fleming know that the prosecutor was looking for him. Id. 
Motion to dismiss 
Within two weeks, both defendants moved to quash the ref iled information as 
being "in violation of the standards established by the Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)."8 Defendants cited no other basis for barring 
the refiled charges. At the parties' request, the Brickey motion was set for hearing 
before the magistrate who dismissed the original information. See generally T09:ll (a 
The pleadings file does not contain a signed written order dismissing the 
case. The only record of the dismissal is an unsigned minute entry, R08:67, and the 
trial court's oral ruling, T08:26:8-12. 
8
 In fact, only Pacheco-Ortega filed a written motion, but Ceron joined that 
motion orally at the hearing held on the motion. See R09:ll:2. 
11 
complete transcript of the April 23,2009 Brickey hearing is attached as Addendum 
E). 
Defendants' argument. At the Brickey hearing, Pacheco-Ortega conceded that 
good cause justified the first two continuances. T09:ll:3-5. He argued, however, 
that the dismissal at the April 2nd hearing occurred "because the State did not have 
sufficient evidence to go forward and because of that, there are requirements under 
Brickey and under the due process clause of the state constitution that the State then 
has to comply with before a refiling is appropriate/' T09:ll:5. Pacheco-Ortega 
contended that the investigator's talking to Fleming's out-of-state mother was not a 
sufficient change of circumstances under Brickey: "There's got to be a lot more 
contact, a lot more communication, much more substantial, meaningful 
communications between the state and this missing witness before refiling is 
appropriate, not some indication from a mother that she might hear from her son." 
T09:ll:6. 
Ceron joined Pacheco-Ortega's argument. T09:l 1:7-9. Both defendants 
viewed the refiling as violating the magistrate's prior order dismissing the case. 
T09:ll:5-9. Both believed that the magistrate's prior order directed the prosecutor 
that before refiling, he "better have a good discussion with Mr. Fleming about 
12 
where he was, why he wasn't there and his intentions to go forward on this/7 
T09:ll:6; see also T09:ll:8-ll. 
Prosecutor's argument? The prosecutor argued that he refiled the charges in 
good faith. T09:ll:20. In explaining the quick refiling, the prosecutor highlighted 
the seriousness of the alleged crimes, the consequent need to continue to hold both 
defendants, and the procedural history of the prosecution. T09:ll:15-21. The 
prosecutor noted that Fleming had been personally served by the District Attorney's 
office three times and that each time, Fleming appeared in court: the first time to 
testify against the twin juveniles at a preliminary hearing in juvenile court and the 
next two times to testify at the first two preliminary hearing dates in this case.10 
T09:ll:16-17. 
The prosecutor did not have Fleming personally served for the April 2nd 
hearing, because Fleming was then in custody and subject to a transportation order. 
T09:ll:18. The prosecutor learned just 24 hours before the April 2nd hearing that 
9
 The prosecutor did not file a written response because Pacheco-Ortega did 
not file his supporting memorandum until the morning of the hearing. R09:ll:2. 
10
 Although Fleming was in custody at the second preliminary hearing, the 
prosecutor explained that Fleming appeared at that hearing pursuant to subpoena, 
and not as a result of a material witness warrant or transport order. T09:ll:17. 
Thus, it appears that he was taken into custody at the hearing. 
13 
Fleming had recently been released from custody. T09:ll:18. The prosecutor 
attempted personal service, but was unable to do so on such short notice. T09:ll:18. 
The prosecutor explained that right after the April 2nd hearing, he learned 
that his investigator had contacted Fleming's mother to learn of Fleming's 
whereabouts. T09:ll:18. After the decision to refile had been made, the 
prosecution's investigators also contacted Fleming's brother, who lived with 
Fleming's mother. Fleming's brother confirmed that Fleming was still in the Salt 
Lake area, had contacted his family, and had received the investigator's messages. 
T09:ll:19. 
Given Fleming's history of appearing at prior court hearings, the prosecutor 
explained that he had no reason to believe that Fleming would not be cooperative 
and appear if subpoenaed. T09:ll:19. The prosecutor justified refiling based on a 
reasonable belief that he would be able to locate Fleming and, if necessary, serve 
him with a material witness warrant. In addition to the contacts with Fleming's 
mother and brother, the prosecutor relied on the fact that Fleming was under the 
supervision of pretrial services and scheduled to appear for sentencing on his own 
case on April 24,2009 (the day after the Brickey hearing), and, consequently, could 
be easily served with a subpoena or material witness warrant. T09:ll:20. 
14 
The prosecutor further explained that even without Mr. Fleming, the State 
would have refiled the case. T09:ll:20,26. Although Fleming "was the witness that 
the State was counting on to adduce evidence at the preliminary hearing/7 the State 
now had sufficient evidence to proceed against both defendants without Fleming's 
testimony. T09:ll:20-21. In addition to physical evidence and other witnesses, the 
State was in preliminary discussions to have the twin juvenile co-defendants 
testify.] * T09:ll:21. The prosecutor explained that he did not subpoena these other 
witnesses for the April 2nd preliminary hearing, because he expected Fleming to be 
there and did not think he would need them. T09:11:21. The prosecutor contended 
that given Fleming's track record of appearing, that expectation was reasonable. 
T09:ll:26. 
The prosecutor also argued that based on the facts, State v. Atencio, 2004 UT 
App 93,89 P.3d 191, was more applicable than Brickey. The prosecutor argued that 
As noted earlier, several police officers rescued Fleming from the trunk, 
noted his injuries, and found the weapons used to inflict those injuries. R09:3; 
T09:ll:15. Fleming also gave a statement to police implicating the defendants. 
R09:2; T09:ll:15. That statement, with or without Fleming's presence, might be 
admissible as reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing. See Utah Const, art. 1, § 12 
(state constitution does not preclude reliable hearsay); Utah R. Evid. 1102 (defining 
reliable hearsay for preliminary hearings to include certain written statements of 
declarant and other hearsay with indicia of reliability; State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 
58, y^ 9-16, 218 P.3d 590 (holding no federal or state constitutional right to 
confrontation in preliminary hearings). 
15 
Atencio and other cases had narrowed Brickeys holding so as to make it inapplicable 
where there was no evidence of bad faith or abusive practices on the part of the 
prosecution. T09:ll:21-23. 
The magistrate's ruling 
The magistrate acknowledged that the charges against Defendants were 
"serious personal assaultive attacks/7 T09:ll:31. She also acknowledged that 
Fleming had appeared at all previous hearings and that the State "had every 
indication from Mr. Fleming that they would be able to put on a preliminary 
hearing with Mr. Fleming's testimony." T09:ll:32. The magistrate stated that she 
had taken all that into account when she determined to dismiss the original 
information without prejudice, "because that still afforded the State the opportunity 
to freely prosecute very, very serious allegations when they were in a position to go 
forward with those cases." T09:ll:33. 
The magistrate then recalled that she had specifically asked the prosecutor at 
the April 2nd preliminary hearing if the State could go forward without Fleming's 
testimony. T09:ll:33-34. According to the magistrate, the prosecutor stated that he 
had anticipated a dismissal without prejudice and was ready to immediately refile 
the charges. T09:ll:33-34. The magistrate remembered, "at that point," 
16 
"questioning] if the State was in a position to refile why they could not go forward 
with the preliminary hearing/7 T09:ll:34. 
In fact, the transcript of the April 2nd hearing does not support the 
magistrate's recollection. It is true that the magistrate confirmed with the 
prosecutor that Fleming was both a "key material witness" and "the victim." 
T08:26:7. But the magistrate never questioned the prosecutor on why, if he was in a 
position to refile, he "could not go forward with the preliminary hearing." T08:26:3-
12. As the prosecutor later explained at the Brickey hearing, he was not prepared to 
proceed at the April 2nd hearing with the other witnesses, because he had expected 
Fleming to appear and had therefore not subpoenaed his other witnesses. T09:11:21. 
The magistrate nevertheless concluded that the prosecutor's "refiling as 
quickly as he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice and bad faith." T09:ll:35-
38. Specifically, the magistrate found that it was bad faith for the prosecutor to say 
that he "could not proceed on that [April 2nd] preliminary hearing because Mr. 
Fleming was not present," and then "to walk out the door and upon a phone call 
with a family member that they anticipated would hear from [Fleming] and not 
even following up with any more attempts to try and get them... ." T09:ll:37. The 
magistrate essentially viewed the prosecutor's quick refiling as flouting the 
magistrate's authority: 
17 
When the State went out and refiled it as quickly as they did with the 
emotions that - well, we're just going to refile this anyway so anything 
the court does or anything the defense does is meaningless because this 
is a horrible act - and it is - and so we're just going to refile it anyway, 
is simply the type of limitations that judicious prosecution cannot pass 
and I am not happy with the result of what that means but I don't think 
that there is any other way to fairly assess the very aggressive refiling 
when the State did not have an adequate change in circumstances to 
come forward to the Court and swear that they could then go forward 
with the prosecution before they refiled. They simply refiled without 
going through the necessary process that they needed to. 
T09:ll:37-38. The magistrate then dismissed the cases against both Defendants 
"pursuant to the Brickey standard as well as the followup cases that specifically 
address abusive factors, find that these factors do rise to those levels . . .' ." 
T09:ll:38. See also R09:9 (written order dismissing case on ground that refiling 
"violated the standards articulated in State v. Brickey"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate dismissed the refiled felony charges under the authority of 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Brickey held that when charges are 
dismissed after a preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause, due process 
precludes a prosecutor from refiling the same charges unless he or she shows either 
that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that some other good 
cause justifies refiling. Brickey s presumptive bar to refiling, however, applies only 
when potential abusive practices that implicate due process or fundamental fairness 
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are involved. This Court has also held that the Brickey rule does not apply where the 
prior dismissal was based, not on lack of probable cause after the presentation of 
evidence, but on the prosecution's inability to proceed. 
The Brickey rule does not apply to this case, because the original charges were 
dismissed based on the prosecution's inability to proceed and not on the lack of 
probable cause. Also, no evidence suggests that the refiling involved a potential 
abusive practice implicating due process. 
First, it is undisputed that the first two stipulated continuances were due, not 
to any fault of the State, but out of respect for the constitutional rights of the 
victim/ witness. Second, it is uncontroverted that the State's inability to proceed at 
the April 2nd hearing was not the result of prosecutorial misconduct or neglect. 
Finally, refiling without first locating Fleming was not a potential abusive practice 
implicating due process, because it neither gave an unfair advantage to the 
prosecutor nor worked any fundamental fairness against the defendants. Refiling 
without first locating Fleming would, at most, inconvenience the defendants only if 
the prosecutor could not proceed as a result. The prosecutor here, however, 
represented that he was ready to proceed on the refiled charges with or without 
Fleming's testimony. Moreover, that representation had not yet been tested, 
because no preliminary hearing on the refiled charges had been set. Consequently, 
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the refiling did not even inconvenience the defendants, let alone implicate their due 
process rights. 
The magistrate, therefore, erred in dismissing under Brickey. 
ARGUMENT 
BRICKEY DOES NOT PRECLUDE REFILING A FELONY 
INFORMATION, WHERE THE PRIOR DISMISSAL WAS NOT 
BASED ON A LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND WHERE NO 
EVIDENCE SUGGESTED A POTENTIAL ABUSIVE PRACTICE 
The magistrate based the dismissal of these felony cases solely on the 
authority of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). As shown below, Brickey's 
presumptive bar to refiling is triggered only when the previous charges were 
dismissed for a lack of probable cause based on insufficient evidence and when 
there is a potential for abusive practices by the prosecutor. Brickey is not triggered 
where, as here, the charges are dismissed, not for insufficient evidence to support 
probable cause, but for the prosecutor's inability to proceed. Moreover, the 
prosecutor's immediate refiling in this case was not a potential abusive practice that 
implicated due process, where the prosecutor stood able and willing to proceed 
with or without Fleming's testimony. The magistrate therefore erred in dismissing 
the refiled charges as violating Brickey. 
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A. Brickeyfs presumptive bar against refiling applies only when the 
original charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause and when 
due process is implicated by a potential abusive practice. 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine "whether there is 
sufficient cause to believe a crime has been committed to warrant further 
proceedings/7 Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646. In that regard, the preliminary hearing "acts 
as a screening device to 'ferret out . . . groundless and improvident prosecutions/" 
Id. at 646 (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)) (omission in 
Brickey). If the State produces sufficient evidence to establish "'probable cause that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it/ the 
defendant is bound over for trial." State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, If 8,151 P.3d 171. See 
also Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(2). But if the State does not produce sufficient evidence of 
probable cause, the charge is dismissed without prejudice and the defendant 
discharged. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3). 
Court rule provides that a dismissal for lack of probable cause due to 
insufficient evidence does not "preclude the state from instituting a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3); see also Brickey, 714 P.2d 
at 646. But the Utah Supreme Court in Brickey held that state "due process 
considerations [do] prohibit a prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier 
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or 
previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies 
refiling/' Id. at 647. 
The prosecutor in Brickey refiled charges previously dismissed for failure to 
establish probable cause at preliminary hearing. Id. at 645. At a second preliminary 
hearing before a different magistrate, the prosecutor adduced a little more evidence 
and Brickey was bound over for trial. Id. In response to Brickey's motion to 
dismiss, the prosecutor freely admitted to forum shopping to obtain a favorable 
outcome: "I disagreed with the [first judge], to be honest with you . . . . I have a 
chance to come back here every time and represent evidence until I get it bound 
over . . . . " Id. at 645-46 [brackets in Brickey], 
The Brickey court held that "fundamental fairness" imposed limits on the 
State's ability to refile criminal charges dismissed due to a failure to produce 
sufficient evidence of probable cause. Id. at 646-47. Otherwise, "the State could 
easily harass defendants by refiling criminal charges which had previously been 
dismissed for insufficient evidence/7 Id. at 647. Thus, Brickey held that when 
charges are dismissed for insufficient evidence, due process precludes a prosecutor 
from refiling the same charges unless he or she shows either that "new or previously 
unavailable evidence has surfaced" or that some "other good cause justifies 
refiling." Id. at 647. The prosecutor must also, "whenever possible," refile the 
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charges before the same magistrate, "who does not consider the matter de novo, but 
looks at the facts to determine whether the new evidence or changed circumstances 
are sufficient to require a re-examination and possible reversal" of the earlier 
dismissal. Id. The Brickey court borrowed its rule from Oklahoma. Id. at 647 (citing 
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767, refined 
the Brickey rule. It explained that "one important purpose underlying the Brickey 
rule is to protect defendants from intentional prosecutorial harassment arising from 
repeated filings of groundless claims before different magistrates in the hope that 
some magistrate will eventually bind the defendants over for trial." Id. at f^ 13. 
Another important purpose was to prevent the State from "intentionally holding 
back crucial evidence" to impair a defendant's ability to prepare for trial. Id. at f 14. 
In other words, the Brickey rule was based on the premise that "fundamental 
fairness" or "due process" "precludes, without limitation, a prosecutor from seeking 
an unfair advantage over a defendant through repeated filings of groundless and 
improvident charges, or from withholding evidence." Id. at % 15. "To the extent 
that these overzealous practices may infringe on a defendant's right to due process, 
Brickey limits the State's ability to refile charges that have been dismissed for 
insufficient evidence." Id. at \ 15 (emphasis added). 
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But the Morgan court made clear that Brickey does not "indicate any intent to 
forbid refiling generally or preclude refiling where a defendant's due process rights 
are not implicated." Id. at ^ 15. Rather, Brickey's presumptive bar to refiling applies 
only "when potential abusive practices are involved." Id. at f 16. "When potential 
abusive practices are not involved . . . there is no presumptive bar to refiling." Id. 
(citing in support numerous other jurisdictions, including Oklahoma). See also 
Rogers, 2006 UT 85, f 10. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i). "The lodestar of Brickey, 
then, is fundamental fairness." Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f^ 15. 
In State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113, 37 P.3d 1160, the supreme court provided a 
"working list of potentially abusive practices" that could presumptively bar refiling 
under Brickey. As it had said in Morgan, those practices include "'forum shopping, 
repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges for the purpose to harass,.. 
. withholding evidence, . . . [and] refil[ing] a charge after providing no evidence of 
an essential and clear element of a crime.'" Rogers, 2006 UT 85, f^ 11 (quoting Redd, 
2001 UT 113,1f 20) (brackets in Rogers). 
Thus, the "Brickey rule is a narrow one." State v. Zahn, 2008 UT App 56, <[  5, 
180 P.3d 186. By its terms, Brickeyfs holding limits a prosecutor's ability to refile 
only when the charges were earlier dismissed for lack of probable cause after the 
prosecutor had presented its evidence. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-47. See also Morgan, 
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2001 UT 87, f 15; State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, \ 19, 89 P.3d 1 91 And the Utah 
Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to expand the rule beyond those instances 
when a potential abusive practice truly implicates due process. See, e.g., Morgan, 
2001 UT 87, Tff 21-25 (due process not implicated under Brickey by refiling when 
prosecutor innocently miscalculates quantum of evidence necessary for bindover); 
Rogers, 2006 UT 85, Tjlj 5, 12-21 (due process not implicated under Brickey when 
magistrate continues preliminary hearing to allow State to prepare and present 
additional evidence). Cf. Zahn, 2008 UT App 56, ^ 1-5 (due process not implicated 
under Brickey by filing greater charge against defendant after prosecutor failed to 
present sufficient evidence of lesser charge at preliminary hearing). 
B. Brickey's presumptive bar against refiling does not apply when the 
original charges were dismissed based on the prosecutor's inability 
to proceed and no evidence suggests a potential abusive practice. 
Consistent with the foregoing authority, this Court has held that the Brickey 
rule does not apply where the prior dismissal was based, not on a lack of probable 
cause after the presentation of evidence, but on the prosecution's inability to 
proceed, so long as no evidence suggests a potential abusive practice. State v. 
Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^  19, 89 P.3d 191. 
In Atencio, the preliminary hearing was continued twice, once because the 
State's toxicology analysis was not yet completed. Id. at Tf 2. Just before the third 
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preliminary hearing setting, the prosecutor discovered that her case file was 
missing. Id. at ^ 3. At first, the prosecutor believed she could proceed without her 
file, but then realized after swearing in her first witness—but before evidence was 
presented—that she could not. Id. at ^ 3-4. The prosecutor moved to dismiss the 
case without prejudice, but refiled the information two days later. Id. at f^f 3-5. The 
refiled case was assigned to a different magistrate. Id. at ^ 5. Relying on Brickey, the 
new magistrate dismissed the refiled charges on Atencio's motion. Id. at f | 5-6. 
Relying on Oklahoma cases—on which the Brickey rule was modeled—this 
Court reversed. This Court distinguished "between cases that w e^re originally 
dismissed because the State was unable to proceed, and cases that were originally 
dismissed because the State did not present sufficient evidence" after putting on its 
evidence. Id. at f^f 16-17. This Court primarily relied on Browning v. State, 648 P.2d 
1261,1263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), where the prosecution was unable to proceed at 
preliminary hearing due to a lack of district attorneys and a recent jail break. The 
case was dismissed and refiled the next day and, after a second preliminary hearing, 
Browning was bound over to stand trial. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, f 16 (citing 
Browning, 648 P.2d at 1263). Relying on Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1971) and its progeny, Browning argued that the trial court erred in binding him 
over because "no newly discovered evidence was presented to support the refiling 
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of the charge/712 Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ]\ 16 (citing Browning, 648 P.2d at 1263). 
The Oklahoma court disagreed because those cases referred only '"to instances 
where the State presented insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing; whereas 
in [Browning's] case, the State was not ready to present evidence at the first 
preliminary hearing/" Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^ 16 (quoting Browning, 648 P.2d at 
1248). 
The Atencio court next cited Lampe v. State, 540 P.2d 590,595 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1975). That case held that refiling charges "twice dismissed at preliminary hearing 
for lack of witnesses was not a denial of due process." Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^ 
16. See also Martinez v. State, 569 P.2d 497,499 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (due process 
did not bar refiling information twice dismissed at preliminary hearing due to rape 
victim's failure to appear). 
Based on these Oklahoma case, the Atencio court determined that Brickey did 
not apply where the dismissal of the original charges was based not on insufficient 
evidence after the prosecution had presented its case, but on the prosecution's 
inability to proceed: 
In Brickey, the original charge was dismissed for insufficient evidence 
after the prosecution had presented evidence at the preliminary 
12As stated, Brickey'rs holding was based on Jones. See Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. 
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hearing. In this case, although the preliminary hearing had technically 
begun and one witness had been sworn in, the prosecutor had not 
presented any evidence and the case was dismissed based on her 
inability to proceed rather than insufficient evidence. 
Atencio, 2004 UT 93, <([ 15 (citation omitted). This Court likewise distinguished 
Atencio's case from Redd, in which the original charge was dismissed after the State 
had presented its evidence at a preliminary hearing. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, n.3. 
The Atencio court also found no evidence of a "'potential abusive practice^' 
that would have implicated [Atencio's] due process rights/7 Atencio, 2004 UT App 
93, Tf 15 (quoting Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^ 21). First, nothing suggested that the 
prosecutor was engaging in a "potential abusive practice" when she misplaced her 
file. Id. at *[[ 15. Second, even though a different magistrate had been assigned to the 
refiled charges, that fact alone did not demonstrate that the State was engaged in 
forum shopping. Id. at ^ 17. Finally, the fact that Atencio may have had "to go to 
court on several occasions" on the same charges was "of little significance in the 
absence of any potential misconduct on the part of the prosecution." Id. at f 18. 
"'[D]ue process is not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience because the 
'nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals 
who have been accused of crimes/" Id. at If 18 (quoting Morgan, 2001 UT 87, If 22). 
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In sum, the Brickey rule presumptively barring refiling applies only where the 
original charges are dismissed for a lack of probable cause after the prosecution has 
presented its evidence and where there is evidence of a potential abusive practice. It 
does not apply where the original charges are dismissed because the prosecutor is 
unable to proceed because of a missing witness, and where no evidence shows the 
prosecutor engaged in a potential abusive practice. 
C, Brickey did not bar refiling in this case because the original charges 
were dismissed for the prosecutor's inability to proceed and no 
evidence suggests a potential abusive practice. 
This case is indistinguishable from Atencio. First, like Atencio, the original 
charges in this case were dismissed, not for insufficient evidence, but because the 
prosecutor was unable to proceed. Like the prosecutor in Atencio, the prosecutor 
here put on no evidence. Consequently, in dismissing the original charges, the 
magistrate made no assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
probable cause. Rather, the magistrate made clear that she was dismissing the 
charges without prejudice because the prosecutor was unable to proceed when his 
victim/witness did not appear. T08:26:10-ll. Thus, under Atencio and the 
Oklahoma authorities relied therein, Brickey did not presumptively bar refiling. See 
Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, f 115-16; Browning, 648 P.2d at 1263; Lampe, 540 P.2d at 
29 
595. See also Martinez, 569 P.2d at 499 (due process did not bar refiling information 
twice dismissed at preliminary hearing due to rape victim's failure to appear). 
Second, as in Atencio, no evidence in this case suggests that the prosecutor 
engaged in a potential abusive practice like those listed in Morgan and Redd. See 
Redd, 2001 UT 113, f^ 20. Although the refiled case was initially assigned to a 
different magistrate, nothing in the record suggests that this was the result of the 
prosecutor's request as opposed to random assignment. Indeed, the prosecutor here 
agreed that the Brickey motion should be heard by the original magistrate. See 
R09:17 (minute entry in Pacheco-Ortega's appellate record); Atencio, 2004 UT App 
93, ^ 17 (refiling before different magistrate by itself not proof of forum shopping). 
In any event, forum shopping could not have resulted in a better outcome for the 
prosecutor where no magistrate had previously assessed the case for probable 
cause. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^ 13 (a chief evil targeted by Brickey was forum 
shopping to intentionally harass defendants by repeatedly filing "groundless claims 
before different magistrates in the hope that some magistrate will eventually bind 
the defendants over for trial"). 
For the same reason, this case also does not involve the potential abusive 
practices of "repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges for the 
purpose to harass/' or "withholding evidence" and "refil[ing] a charge after 
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providing no evidence of an essential and clear element of a crime." Redd, 2001 UT 
113, If 20. Because the prosecution has never presented its evidence at a preliminary 
hearing, the assessment of whether the charges are supported by probable cause or 
are "groundless" or "improvident" has never been made.13 Nor could the 
prosecutor have withheld evidence when none was presented. 
Nor is this a case involving any other potential abusive practice of the sort 
listed in Redd. As explained, for Brickey purposes, the abusive practice must rise to 
the level of implicating the defendant's due process rights. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 
^ 15-16. This is not a case where the preliminary hearing had to be repeatedly 
continued based on the prosecutor's misconduct or lack of preparedness. The 
magistrate and both defense counsel acknowledged that the first two continuances 
were not the fault of the State. T09:ll:30-32; Add B:4-7; T08:25:4~5; T08:26:5-6. 
Indeed, the prosecution was prepared and ready to go with its witnesses—including 
Fleming—at the first two settings. The parties and the magistrate agreed that the 
hearing should be continued both times, however, to accommodate the 
u
 It should be noted that this is not a prosecution that rests solely on the 
testimony of one witness. Here, according to the probable cause statement, several 
police officers rescued Fleming from the trunk of car, observed his serious injuries, 
and found the weapons used to inflict them at the scene. R09:l-3. Thus, while the 
preliminary hearing screening has not yet been made, these charges could hardly be 
called either "groundless" or "improvident." 
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victim/witnesses' constitutional rights. Add B:3-6; T08:26:4-7. Moreover, it was 
Pacheco-Ortega's counsel who first suggested the need for counsel for the 
victim/witness. T08:26:6-7. 
The inability to go forward at the April 2nd hearing likewise was not the 
product of prosecutorial misconduct or neglect. As the magistrate acknowledged, 
the prosecutor reasonably believed that Fleming's presence was assured for the 
April 2nd preliminary hearing, because Fleming was in custody. T09:ll:31-33. It 
was only the day before the preliminary hearing that the prosecutor learned that 
Fleming had recently been released. T08:26:4-5; T09:ll:18. But based on Fleming's 
excellent record of appearing, the prosecutor had every reason to believe that 
Fleming would voluntarily appear at the April 2nd hearing. T09:ll:15-20. Thus, 
this is not a case where the prosecutor was repeatedly unprepared to go forward. 
Indeed, until the April 2nd hearing, the prosecutor was always prepared to proceed. 
The magistrate nevertheless found that the prosecutor's "refiling as quickly as 
he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice and bad faith." T09:ll:35-38. The 
magistrate found the refiling to be in bad faith because the prosecutor represented 
that he "could not proceed on that [April 2nd] preliminary hearing because Mr. 
Fleming was not present," but then immediately refiled, based only "upon a phone 
call with a family member that they anticipated [they] would hear from" Fleming. 
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T09:ll:37. The magistrate recalled, albeit erroneously, "questioning] if tho State 
was in a position to refile why they could not go forward with the preliminary 
hearing." T09:ll:34. Thus, the magistrate viewed the immediate refiling before 
locating Fleming as an act of defiance by the prosecutor: "When the State went out 
and refiled it as quickly as they did with the emotions that - well, we're just going to 
refile this anyway so anything the court does or anything the defense does is 
meaningless because this is a horrible act . . . ." T09:ll:37-38. 
As a threshold matter, the transcript of the April 2nd hearing does not bear 
out the magistrate's recollections. First, the magistrate never asked the prosecutor 
why, if the State was in a position to refile it could not go forward with the 
preliminary hearing on April 2nd. See Statement of Facts, footnote 9; see also 
Addendum D. Second, the prosecutor later explained at the Brickey hearing that he 
could not proceed at the April 2nd preliminary hearing without Fleming because, 
believing that Fleming would appear, he had not subpoenaed other witnesses. 
T09:ll:21. Thus, stating that Fleming was an "essential" or "key material witness"' 
was not a representation that the prosecutor could never proceed without Fleming; 
it meant only that he could not proceed on April 2nd without Fleming. And even 
assuming that the prosecutor believed that he needed Fleming when he made the 
April 2nd representation, he was within his discretion to later reassess his case and 
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determine in good faith that he could proceed without Fleming, if necessary. The 
magistrate's finding of bad faith, therefore, was clearly erroneous. 
But even if the finding were not clearly erroneous, the conduct relied on by 
the magistrate for the bad faith finding did not rise to the level of an abusive 
practice as defined by Brickey and its progeny. Again, an abusive practice for Brickey 
purposes must implicate due process or fundamental fairness. See Morgan, 2001 UT 
87, Tf^f 15-16. Here, refiling immediately without having first contacted Fleming 
worked no fundamental fairness against the defendants. Indeed, refiling without 
first locating Fleming would, at most, have merely inconvenienced the defendants if 
the prosecutor could not have proceeded at any subsequent preliminary hearing. 
The prosecutor, however, informed the magistrate that he could and would proceed 
on the refiled charges with or without Fleming's presence. But at the time of the 
Brickey hearing, no preliminary hearing had yet been set. Thus, refiling the charges 
without having contacted Fleming personally did not even inconvenience the 
defendants, let alone implicate due process concerns. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, \ 22 
(due process not concerned with "ordinary levels of inconvenience'' because "nature 
of criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals who have 
been accused of crimes"). 
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Refiling the charges without having first found Fleming also gave the 
prosecutor no unfair advantage. If anything, it placed the prosecutor in a more 
precarious position by potentially requiring him to proceed without the victim, 
should the State ultimately be unable to find him before the next preliminary 
hearing. Given that the refiling under these circumstances neither gave the 
prosecutor an unfair advantage nor even inconvenienced the defendants, if the 
prosecutor did act in bad faith, his conduct did not constitute a potential abusive 
practice for Brickey purposes. 
At bottom, the magistrate's finding of bad faith related not to due process 
concerns, but to her belief that the prosecutor had flouted her authority and prior 
instructions. The remedy for a prosecutor's contemptuous behavior, however, is not 
to dismiss a serious felony prosecution with prejudice. Rather, the remedy for 
contemptuous behavior, if any, is to sanction the prosecutor personally. Cf. Salt 
Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah App. 1996) ("[dismissal of a 
criminal information as a sanction against the prosecutor is rarely appropriate, even 
if the prosecutor is in contempt of court"); State v. Bolen, 13 P.3d 1270,1274 (Kan. 
2000) ("[dismissal of charges oftentimes punishes the public rather than the 
prosecutor and creates a windfall for the defendant"); Utah R. Crim. P. 25 (setting 
forth when dismissal with prejudice appropriate). 
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The magistrate therefore erred in dismissing the refiled charges under Brickey. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted March Jtf, 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
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PO<6& (Lpfc&k B. DUPAIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
36 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on March <^f , 2010, two copies of the foregoing brief were 
[mailed D hand-delivered to: 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
4764 South 900 East, Ste 2 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
A digital copy of the brief was also included:^Yes D No 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
Rule 7(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Proceedings Before Magistrate 
(i)( 1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and 
laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of proof and 
shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may 
testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-
examine adverse witnesses. 
(i)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall order that 
the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause 
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was 
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has 
been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the 
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude 
the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
Rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Dismissal Without Trial 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may, 
either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or 
indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial; 
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of 
particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to 
be charged in the pleading so filed; 
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the impaneling 
or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury; 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered in the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable delay, or the 
court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the information or 
indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the 
grand jury, further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and the court may make 
such orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges 
as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and 
bail exonerated. 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to 
trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the 
offense charged. 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may dismiss the case 
if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party. The injured party shall first 
acknowledge the compromise before the court or in writing. The reasons for the order 
shall be set forth therein and entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another 
prosecution for the same offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall 
not be granted when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in 
the performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony. 
Addendum B 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JANUARY 15, 2009 
2 HONORABLE JUDGE ANN BOYDEN 
3 (Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Is there something we can handle for 
7 either Mr. Sleight or Mr. Peterson? 
8 MR. PETERSON: I have Pacheco-Ortega. 
9 MR. SLEIGHT: And I have Ceron Your Honor, 
10 C-E-R-O-N. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Let me get those files 
12 then. Hyphenated, there we go. What was yours Mr. Sleight? 
13 MR. SLEIGHT: Ceron, C-E-R-O-N. 
14 THE COURT: I do have that. I do have both of 
15 those files then. Are each of them still in custody? 
16 MR. SLEIGHT: Yes, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: And this is yours, Mr. Bown? 
18 MR. BOWN: Yes it is, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: This is why you were writing on your 
20 hand the other day because you can't hold onto the hand-
21 helds. All right. Both defendants are out and I'm assuming 
22 that they're standing next to the attorney so that I know who 
23 J they are. We're using the interpreter, Mr. Peterson for 
24 yours, Mr. Pacheco. And do we need an interpreter for Mr. 
25 Ceron? 
MR. SLEIGHT: No Your Honor, Mr. Ceron speaks very 
good English. 
THE COURT: All right then. What is requested on 
this, scheduling conference or where are we? 
MR. BOWN: Your Honor, what happened if I'm not 
mistaken, I came in after the fact, is Mr. (inaudible) about 
this. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOWN: We had our witnesses present, we found 
out that our witness (inaudible) in this case has a warrant 
outstanding so he needs an attorney. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. BOWN: He will get an attorney through that 
process and we'll just make sure that it happens before our 
next preliminary hearing date. I think we have an agreement 
that everybody is agreeing to continue it to the 26th of 
February, which works well for all of us. If I missed 
anything else, I'll let defense counsel (inaudible) anything 
that I may have — 
THE COURT: Is this something that needs to be 
special set or just on any preliminary hearing calendar 
that's available on the 26th? 
MR. BOWN: We only have two witnesses, Your Honor. 
I don't imagine that there's any other - these are the only 
two attorneys for the two co-defendants (inaudible). 
1 THE COURT: On the 26th of February, is that still 
2 what we're talking about? 
3 MR. BOWN: That's what (inaudible). 
4 THE COURT: Everybody agrees that this should be 
5 continued. 
6 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, I think that is 
7 appropriate because (inaudible) Michael Fleming to take the 
8 stand. He will be questioned and probably end up invoking 
9 the Fifth at this point and so I've advised Mr. Pacheco-
10 Ortega of that procedure peculiarity. What I'd ask if 
11 somehow the State could facilitate his booking on the - the 
12 victim's booking on the outstanding case so that Patrick 
13 Anderson can quickly assign conflict counsel. 
14 THE COURT: That was my next question. Mr. 
15 Sleight, you're on this case by conflict. 
16 MR. SLEIGHT: We were retained by Mr. Ceron's 
17 family. 
18 THE COURT: Oh. So, this is the first time there's 
19 going to be a conflict on this with LDA but with Mr. 
20 Peterson— 
21 MR. PETERSON: Actually Your Honor, there was a 
22 previous conflict involving juvenile co-defendants who have 
23 I now been bound over to adult court but that conflict has been 
24 dealt with. 
2 5
 THE COURT: Do you think that can all occur by the 
1 26th of February? 
2 MR. SLEIGHT: Sure. 
3 MR. SOWN: Yeah, we talked with the (inaudible) 
4 victim, Mr. Fleming today. We're going to facilitate that 
5 (inaudible) and get it moving along. 
6 MR. SLEIGHT: My only request would be that if we 
7 could set that in the afternoon. I have some classes that 
8 morning. 
9 THE COURT: Well, it's set in the afternoon today. 
10 It's my calendar. I think that will make it easier for 
11 everyone to be involved. So February 26, 2:00 my calendar 
12 and let's not have a whole bunch said on that if we're doing 
13 this but it doesn't look like it's going to be (inaudible). 
14 All right, fair enough. 
15 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
16 THE COURT: Anything else we need to address? 
17 Let's make sure we've got sufficient interpreters. We will 
18 need one for at least co-defendant. Are the witnesses going 
19 to need some? 
20 MR. BOWN: No, I don't believe it. We have the one 
21 interpreter unless they feel (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: For a regular preliminary hearing 
23 (inaudible). 
24 MR. BOWN: I'll leave it up to the interpreter if 
25 they want a break on that. I (inaudible). 
THE COURT: That I'm not concerned with. What I 
want to make certain is that no witnesses the state 
3 I anticipates are going to need — 
4 MR. BOWN: One will be a police officer and one 
5 will be (inaudible). 
6 MR. PETERSON: Unless the state were to call the 
7 juvenile co-defendants that have been bound over as adults. 
8 THE COURT: If they do that then - because we will 
9 need, regardless of how hard the interpreters can work, it 
10 one is a witness and one is a defendant, we're going to need 
11 separate interpreters. Okay? Very good. 















I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned proceeding held before Judge Ann 
Boyden was transcribed by me from a FTR. recording and 
is a full, true and correct transcription of the requested 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 




Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
Addendum C 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FEBRUARY 26, 2009 
2 JUDGE ANN BOYDEN 
3 (Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Let me pull those two files then and are 
7 they both in custody? Let's have them both brought out and Mr. 
8 Bown, this is your matter? 
9 MR. BOWN: Yes, it is. Judge, can we just deal with 
10 Pacheco-Ortega briefly and then do Ceron. 
11 THE COURT: We'll deal with State vs. Joel Pacheco-
12 Ortega right now with Mr. Peterson and then when we bring out 
13 the second co-defendant. Mr. Sleight, we can address your 
14 matter. But if Mr. Pacheco is right in that holding area, 
15 that's the one we'll address first. 
16 MR. SLEIGHT: Okay, Your Honor, there is another 
17 counsel present for Michael Fleming. He's a witness but he 
18 does have other matters. We'll talk about his presence and why 
19 we're continuing it today (inaudible). 
20 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Sleight, I do 
21 not have that file before we far as a preliminary hearing. 
22 MR. SLEIGHT: But he does have counsel and he's 
23 J present. 
24 THE COURT: Is here and present with counsel at this 
25 time. What is being requested on the Pacheco-Ortega? 
1 MR. PETERSON: For the record, Mike Peterson, present 
2 with Mr. Pacheco-Ortega. 
3 I THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we have the difficult that 
5 the victim witness needed legal representation. As of 
6 yesterday, that victim, Mr. Fleming, was still represented by 
7 our office. So we scrambled around to get conflict counsel 
8 assigned and fortunately conflict counsel is here present today 
9 to consult with Mr. Fleming; however, apparently conflict 
10 counsel would need a little bit more time with Mr. Fleming. 
11 They just barely got the file basically late yesterday, as I 
12 understand it. 
13 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
14 MR. PETERSON: So I talked with Mr. Bown -
15 THE COURT: For the record, conflict counsel may 
16 approach. 
17 MR. STEUR: Chad Steur. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. S-T-E-U-R as I recall, right, 
19 Mr. Steur? 
20 MR. STEUR: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Chad Steur is defense counsel, is here 
22 and present here in court but has just been assigned yesterday, 
23 correct? Okay. Thank you. Mr. Peterson, if you'd continue. 
24 MR. PETERSON: So I spoke with Mr. Bown about this 
25 situation yesterday, Judge, and we made efforts or best efforts 
1 to try to get ready for the hearing today and that's just 
2 simply not going to happen in light of the recently appointed 
3 conflict lawyer. So we've sort of agreed that we can't get 
4 anything done today and we need to reset. We talked with Pat 
5 about April 2 as an availability and that looks like a workable 
6 date for everyone. 
7 THE COURT: All right, thank you. That is a regular 
8 preliminary hearing date, nobody thinks that it's going to take 
9 a special setting as far as time to simply put it on that 
10 calendar? 
11 MR. BOWN: I have two witnesses, one is our victim 
12 witness whose in custody and the other is a police officer. 
13 THE COURT: I think it's easier to keep it on a 
14 preliminary hearing calendar if that's the case then so that 
15 the transport and everything is as clear as possible. All 
16 right and that date that has been tentatively set is the 
17 April 2 date; is that right? 
18 MR. PETERSON: Yes, Judge, at 8:30. We agreed to 
19 meet a half hour earlier to get started here (inaudible) goes 
20 long. I mean, I understand that Monty Sleight is sometimes 
21 difficult to reign in. Oh, he's present. I'm sorry. 
22 THE COURT: (Laughter). All right, very good then. 
23 April 2 at 1:30 is the time that we will reschedule this 
24 preliminary hearing. It is at this time being set with the two 
25 co-defendants that are both going to be heard at that same 
1 hearing. Mr. Sleight is present. His client may not have been 
2 brought to the courtroom yet, but he is present and aware of 
3 that date. Also, Mr. Steur is here representing the victim and 
4 is aware of that setting at this time. My calendar, April 2, 
5 1:30 in the afternoon. What is holding Mr. Pacheco-Ortega in 
6 custody? 
7 MR. PETERSON: Judge, I was about to address that. I 
8 would have argued ordinarily release issues today but there is 
9 an ICE hold on Mr. Pacheco-Ortega and I actually have been in 
10 communication with the Mexican Consulate about this case and my 
11 client's situation. So he unfortunately is not eligible for 
12 any kind of release to pretrial or bail. And likewise, he's 
13 not waiving his speedy trial rights, it's just that the 
14 circumstances mandate this continuance and there's nothing we 
15 can do about it. 
16 THE COURT: I appreciate that being all placed on the 
17 record. It looks to me, Mr. Pacheco-Ortega, all circumstances 
18 do demand that and there's no way that we could reasonably 
19 expect all parties to be in a position where this preliminary 
20 hearing could be heard today given the new conflict counsel now 
21 I on the victim. So I am giving that date. Mr. Peterson is 
22 dealing with as many issues as he can with you. He is 
23 I representing you on this count and will continue to do that and 
24 the next hearing is the April 2nd date. We are using a Spanish 
25 Interpreter for Mr. Pacheco-Ortega today. Does Mr. Ceron need 
6 
1 an interpreter as well? 
2 MR. SLEIGHT: He does not. 
3 THE COURT: Do any of the witnesses need an 
4 interpreter? So we will continue to have the one Spanish 
5 interpreter for that prelim. Thank you. 
6 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. That's all I have if 
7 I could be excused? 
8 THE COURT: Very good. And is that the only matter 
9 you had, Mr. Steur? Do you wish the benefit of the record? 
10 MR. STEUR: No, Your Honor, I'm okay. 
11 THE COURT: You were able to hear what happened. 
12 There's nothing contrary that you wanted to represent. I 
13 appreciate the fact that you now have been assigned to the case 
14 through the representation of the victim and you'll be involved 
15 as part of that picture as well. Thank you. 
16 All right, is Mr. Ceron here? Let's bring him out as 
17 well. Thank you. 
18 Mr. Sleight, I take it you're on this case by 
19 conflict counsel as well, correct? 
20 MR. SLEIGHT: Actually, Your Honor, I've been 
21 retained by Mr. Ceron's family. 
22 THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. So this is not 
23 conflict and that's why the scrambling yesterday was on 
24 conflict counsel because they knew that there would be a 
25 conflict with you for quite some time but... 
7 
1 MR. SLEIGHT: What I can tell you or Mr. Peterson 
2 actually addressed that with you here but he actually let LDA 
3 know a week ago - part of our problem was Mr. Fleming was taken 
4 into custody later on after the date was set. We had told him 
5 to go report to pretrial services, did not do that. So, they 
6 pushed back our ability to get him an attorney through the 
7 court system. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. SLEIGHT: And then Mr. Peterson put that request 
10 in and apparently (inaudible) looked at it. 
11 THE COURT: I appreciate that. That does offer a 
12 little bit of an explanation as to why we did not get that 
13 addressed until yesterday afternoon. Okay, thank you. 
14 Is Mr. Ceron - still being brought up? 
15 MR. SLEIGHT: Yes. He's on the third floor. 
16 I THE COURT: I thought he was, had already been 
17 brought up. If it's still going to be a while and there's any 
18 - but it looks like a hearing, an anticipated hearing? Then 
19 let's try to get this taken care of before. He's still not 
20 here? 
21 MR. (?): Thirty seconds. 
22 THE COURT: We'll bring him up. 
23 I (Whereupon another matter was handled.) 
24 THE COURT: If Mr. Ceron is here, let's continue 
25 I hearing this case. Mr. Louis Ceron, is that how you say it? 
8 
1 MR. SLEIGHT: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Ceron is stepping into the courtroom 
3 now with Mr. Sleight. This is a co-defendant on the matter 
4 that we just addressed in the Pacheco-Ortega matter. We have 
5 reset this over for a preliminary hearing on my calendar on 
6 April 2, Thursday, at 1:30 in the afternoon. Both Mr. Pacheco-
7 Ortega and Mr. Ceron will be having that hearing. We addressed 
8 the purposes of why this hearing is not going forward today. 
9 Does seem appropriate that it needs to be reset. 
10 What more do we need to address on this matter, Mr. 
11 Sleight? 
12 MR. SLEIGHT: Your Honor, what I'd like the Court to 
13 consider is some reduction in bond and the possibility of 
14 release for Mr. Ceron. To get the Court up to speed on some of 
15 the circumstances, when Mr. Ceron was originally arrested on 
16 this charge, the State had filed six charges against Mr. Ceron 
17 all felonies, four of those first degree felonies. It's my 
18 understanding in speaking with the State, they only intend to 
19 pursue two of those, both still first degree felonies but 
20 that's a significant reduction in the amount of charges that 
21 he faced originally. 
22 Part of the reason as I understand it from the State 
23 J prospective is they're agreeing to that is that the feds, the 
24 Federal Government has essentially picked up what would amount 
25 to the drug charges in this particular case and those have been 
1 filed federally, and a federal hold has been placed on Mr. 
2 Ceron. At present that federal hold is no bail in part in 
3 recognition due to their concern about the State charges. 
4 Given that we're at this posture now where the State or because 
5 of circumstances I understand that aren't completely in the 
6 State's control, that certainly aren't in Mr. Ceron's control, 
7 we're not continuing the preliminary hearing for the second 
8 time and Mr. Ceron would benefit from a significant reduction 
9 on bond in that it would give the feds some basis to reconsider 
10 his hold under the federal system. 
11 As far as Mr. Ceron's status, Mr. Ceron is a citizen 
12 of the United States of America. He worked very hard to attain 
13 that citizenship. He has no plans that I'm aware of to 
14 relinquish or surrender that citizenship and wants to remain 
15 here in the United States. He's married, with children. He's 
16 the primary breadwinner for that family, has a home, a business 
17 and tries to function as well as possible in the community. So 
18 given those particular circumstances and given the 
19 circumstances that we're here through a delay that's caused by 
20 no fault of Mr. Ceron, we'd ask the Court to consider a release 
21 I on this matter so that Mr. Ceron could be released to the 
22 federal case. 
23 I As the Court is well aware, if Mr. Ceron does receive 
24 any sort of release in the federal system, it would be heavily 
25 supervised. The federal pretrial system is even more in touch, 
10 
1 let's say, with the people that they supervise than our local 
2 pretrial services and that isn't saying anything bad about our 
3 local pretrial services. It's just to say that the feds have a 
4 lot more resources to put into something and they certainly 
5 would put those resources into a situation like Mr. Ceron's. 
6 So we'd ask the Court to consider a release in this particular 
7 matter or in the alternative, a very significant or substantial 
8 reduction in bond that would allow him to re-approach the 
9 federal courts about release on the federal case. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Let me make sure I am clear 
11 about the underlying foundation condition that you set, Mr. 
12 Sleight, and that is, the State still is anticipating going 
13 forward in Count 1, .Attempted Murder with Injury, a first 
14 degree felony and Count 2, Aggravated Kidnaping, a first degree 
15 felony, those are the two counts still in the State system, 
16 still charged against Mr. Ceron, correct? 
17 MR. SLEIGHT: Do you have the amended information? 
18 THE COURT: Maybe I don't. 
19 MR. SLEIGHT: I have an amended information in my 
20 hand. It's -
21 THE COURT: I don't see an amended information. 
22 MR. SLEIGHT: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: Maybe I do. 
24 MR. BOWN: The intent may have been to file it in the 
25 last preliminary hearing, I'm not sure. 
11 
1 MR. SLEIGHT: I have an amended information in my 
2 hand. 
3 THE COURT: Every time I see an information it does 
4 not have amended. 
5 MR. SLEIGHT: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: So what are you charging Mr. Ceron with? 
7 MR. BOWN: Count 1 is Attempted Murder with Injury, a 
8 first degree felony, with the notice that because of the two or 
9 more persons and the dangerous weapon enhancement and 
10 Aggravated Kidnaping is Count 2, a first degree felony with the 
11 same enhancements, the two or more persons enhancement and the 
12 dangerous weapon enhancement. 
13 THE COURT: And the only reason that the other 
14 charges are not included in this amended information is because 
15 they are being pursued by another jurisdiction. 
16 MR. BOWN: And that's the federal system. 
17 THE COURT: All right. What is the State's response 
18 to the request then? 
19 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, I mean, I understand where Mr. 
20 Sleight and Mr. Ceron are coming from but as you well know, 
21 it's not - the State is not involved in this either. It was a 
22 problem where another person who has a Fifth Amendment right -
23 I I mean, that (inaudible) without his attorney consenting or 
24 being able to adequately represent him and that just wasn't the 
25 case. 
12 
1 I think more telling than anything else with Mr. 
2 Ceron is he actually was given the opportunity to choose 
3 whether he wanted to be in federal custody or state custody. 
4 He chose federal custody at that point. Furthermore, if you 
5 just look at the charges. I mean, even if you take away the 
6 other charges that are part of the holding (inaudible), I 
7 acknowledge that we're not going to pursue any more, you still 
8 have the most, the two most serious charges present which is 
9 attempted murder with injury of the first degree and the 
10 aggravated kidnaping. Attempted murder is not - if found 
11 guilty is not a minimum mandatory but aggravated kidnaping is 
12 an automatic prison sentence if he's found guilty of that. I 
13 think the bail set at $100,000 is - that's pretty normal for 
14 these types of charges. In fact, I was quite surprised that it 
15 wasn't higher when I was looking to see what the bail amount 
16 set at. So, I think the bail should remain at $100,000 
17 (inaudible) and that's the State's argument, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Okay, anything further? Submit it on 
19 I that? 
20 MR. SLEIGHT: I would submit it (inaudible). 
21 THE COURT: I agree, Mr. Ceron. When I look to the 
22 reasonableness of the bail, the first thing I have to look at 
23 is what the charges are. These are the two much more serious 
24 charges and the $100,000 for these two first degree felonies 
25 that involve the type of aggravated allegations and weapon use, 
13 
1 that is alleged in these charges, it simply raises too many 
2 concerns for me as to the safety of the community and your 
3 I likelihood of fleeing when the stakes are this high. So I am 
4 denying the request, the bail will remain at the $100,000. It 
5 is a bailable amount. It is not a cash only and if there is 
6 any posting of bail, there still needs to be some significant 
7 supervision here. I assume that that will occur with the 
8 federal supervision and so I'm not requiring any further 
9 supervision if bail is posted here and it maybe done through 
10 property. It is not a cash only bail. 
11 All right, the April 2 date still remains at 1:30 and 
12 on my calendar. Thank you. 
13 MR. BOWN?: (Inaudible) I think we're all on the same 
14 page. 
15 THE COURT: We are all on the same page and also with 
16 I everything being reflected on today's hearing, even if there 
17 are problems that arise, the hearing needs to go forward on 
18 April 2 or there will be considerable rethinking of what's 
19 happening. 
20 MR. BOWN: We'll be filing the motion to transport 
21 the victim as well. 
22 THE COURT: And they're being transported separately 
23 as well as being held -
24 MR. (?): (Inaudible). 
25 THE COURT: I've learned to recognize that color in 
14 
1 those stripes. So very good, you are coming from a different 
2 custody situation. 
3 MR. BOWN: And the other defendant is being 
4 transported separately as well. 
5 THE COURT: So that at least for the purpose of thes 
6 hearings we can keep the testimony as untainted as possible. 
7 All right. Thank you, appreciate everyone's work on it and 
8 expect that it will continue. Okay. 
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I'm dealing with is the Ceron matter. 
(All talking) 
THE COURT: Okay, at 2:00. Pacheco-Ortega, was it a 
co-defendant though? 
MR. SLEIGHT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And Ceron, thank you. Those are the 
two files I have. 
Mr. Peterson, you're here for Mr. Pacheco. 
MR. PETERSON: Pacheco-Ortega. 
THE COURT: Ortega. Let's have them, brought out. 
MR. PETERSON?: Mr. Ceron is represented by Mr. 
Sleight whose is back in holding. You will probably want to 
end up bringing them both out. 
THE COURT: At the same time. 
MR. PETERSON?: To address the status. 
THE COURT: Is there a problem with bringing them 
both out together? Do we have any witnesses or anything in 
here that — 
MR. PETERSON?: There's shouldn't be a problem as 
far as the witnesses. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SLEIGHT?: That is the problem. 
THE COURT: Is it? That's correct. That's the 
problem? All right. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sleight is also walking out now. 
So we have both of the defendants in the courtroom now and 
they're going with their corresponding attorney and Mr. 
Sleight is here representing Mr. Ceron. We're also using the 
interpreter for just Mr. Pacheco-Ortega? 
. MR. PETERSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: All right and what is anticipated by 
this date? 
MR. FLATER: Your Honor, Eric Flater and Todd Olsen 
are here on behalf of the State and we have an essential 
witness named Michael Fleming who we previously had 
transported from the jail. Unbeknownst to me and my 
secretary, he was recently released from jail so the jail 
contacted us and said the transport order that we had in 
place was not going to happen and we attempted personal 
service this morning because Mr. Fleming was scheduled to 
appear at AP&P for a presentence interview with AP&P. He 
failed to show up to that AP&P appointment and we at this 
point don't know his whereabouts. I've an investigator who 
1 has communicated with him in the past, tried to locate him 
2 but was unsuccessful in doing that. Mr. Hall who is Mr. 
3 Fleming's attorney is present and — 
4 THE COURT: I was just going to ask what Mr. Hall's 
5 role was in this. Now I remember that. Okay, thank you. 
6 MR. FLATER: I spoke with Mr. Hall yesterday and 
7 indicated to him that we would like to get Mr. Fleming here. 
8 I believe Mr. Hall also attempted contact with his client but 
9 was unsuccessful in contacting him. I know that this 
10 preliminary hearing was previously set and we continued 
11 because Mr. Fleming was not represented at that point. At 
12 this point I'm asking the Court to continue this preliminary 
13 hearing as well because of this unavailable witness and we've 
14 had success in tracking him down in the past but due to the 
15 short time frame, were not able to find him for this 
16 preliminary hearing. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sleight, response first of 
18 all? 
19 MR. SLEIGHT: Your Honor, we would object to any 
20 continuance at this point and ask the Court to consider 
21 dismissal. It's our understanding is that Mr. Fleming was 
22 actually released pursuant to a plea bargain with the State. 
23 [ I don't know how accurate that is and maybe Mr. (inaudible) 
can (inaudible) that so for the State to say that they were 24 
25 unaware of his release until today I think is a bit 
1 inaccurate. This is also the third setting that we've had 
2 for this particular case and each time it's been because of 
3 Mr. Fleming and because of some difficulty and we understand 
4 that these type things happen but this is a third settting 
5 for Mr. Ceron. This hold is affecting his ability to try to 
6 and get released from the federal cases on federal matters. 
7 At the very minimum we'd ask the Court to consider just a 
8 straight release on this particular case and order a release 
9 of Mr. Ceron that would allow him to go in front of the 
10 federal judge where if he's released in that matter he would 
11 be released into the auspice of federal pretrial. So our 
12 motion would be to dismiss at this point in the alternative 
13 to the (inaudible) release (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
15 Mr. Peterson, your response for Mr. Pacheco-Ortega. 
16 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, likewise, on behalf of 
17 Mr. Pacheco-Ortega I'd ask the Court to dismiss this matter. 
18 Of course it would be a dismissal without prejudice with the 
19 right of the State to refile were they to find Mr. Fleming 
20 and where Mr. Fleming has actually expressed an active 
21 interest in going forward. It's true that we've continued 
22 this preliminary hearing twice because Mr. Fleming had his 
23 own active felony matter that he needed representation on. 
24 In fact, I was the one that brought that to Mr. Mister's 
25 attention back on January 15. 
1 THE COURT: I remember that. 
2 MR. PETERSON: And so I'm partially responsible for 
3 the need to get Mr. Fleming processed. But nevertheless, the 
4 continuances have not been at Mr. Pacheco-Ortega's request or 
5 through any fault of his own. He's always wanted to go 
6 forward at the last two hearings. 
7 Judge, in this particular case, I'm asking for the 
8 dismissal without prejudice rather than the alternative of 
9 the dismissal because he lives here, he has a family here, he 
10 has work here. If this case were to be dismissed, it appears 
11 that the accompanying immigration hold would likely be 
12 relinquished and he'd be allowed to go back to his young 
13 family and support them and like I said, if Mr. Fleming were 
14 to surface, then we could proceed at that time. 
15 THE COURT: All right, thank you. I'm also 
16 reviewing the probable cause statement and maybe Mr. Flater 
17 you can add some insight on this one. Mr. Fleming is not 
18 only the key material witness, he was the victim? 
19 MR. FLATER: That is correct, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: So, were there other victims that were 
21 injured or — 
22 MR. FLATER: No. He was -
23 THE COURT: He was the one that -
24 MR. FLATER: -the only one. 
25 THE COURT: The allegations are that there was the 
1 beating and the tasering and the putting the gun in the 
2 mouth, those were all towards Mr. Fleming. 
3 MR. FLATER: That's correct, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: The state does not have other victims of 
5 this case. You may have incidental, but as far as the 
6 allegations, the most serious allegations, it's Mr. Fleming, 
7 right? 
8 MR. FLATER: That's correct. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Well, quite frankly, I 
10 think all of the attorneys here know that I'm pretty flexible 
11 even with our policies of continuances on preliminary 
12 hearings but by the third one, and there really just isn't a 
13 good faith basis that you think you can get them and Mr. 
14 Fleming was certainly aware of the fact that the hearings 
15 were going and was - he was appointed with counsel. He had 
16 been given every opportunity to be cooperative in this case 
17 and with him being the listed victim, I'm not as concerned 
18 about his failure to appear affecting other victims that way. 
19 I am going to grant the motion to dismiss. It is without 
20 prejudice and given the nature of these offenses I am not 
21 going to restrict the State in any refiling, from doing it by 
22 warrant. I think that the serious nature of these, that you 
23 may need to proceed with a warrant. Typically when they're 
24 present and represented by counsel, that I ask the State to 
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Fleming being in custody, being aware of this, it may very 
well have even been part of plea negotiations was his 
testimony. I don't know but it seems likely in this 
situation that it's not a good faith request that Mr. Fleming 
did not know and is going to be cooperative in this. The 
State certainly may get that, this case to that position 
again but I am granting the motion to dismiss without 
prejudice. That just means this case isn't going to be 
holding those and I don't know if that's going to make the 
difference in either the federal situation or in the 
immigration but that's all been placed on the record and my 
ruling is as it stands for whatever effect that has on the 
other issues. 
MR. FLATER: May I make one request, Your Honor, 
and that is that you stay the order of dismissal until 5:00 
this afternoon? I do anticipate refiling these cases. I've 
made arrangements with staff in my office and also the 
detective assigned to this case anticipating the likely 
outcome would be a dismissal and made arrangements to have 
these cases immediately refiled. Would the Court stay its 
1 order? 
2 MR. SLEIGHT: Your Honor, I would ask that you not. 
3 It sort of undercuts the purpose of the Court's ruling which 
4 is Mr. Fleming's absence. If something were to change with 
5 regard to Mr. Fleming, that might make sense but with the 
6 status quo, it doesn't make any sense holding it until 5:00 
7 just for a refiling. 
8 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, if I might as well, I 
9 think the Court is very clear that (inaudible) incorporated 
10 in the Court's order, that as to Mr. Fleming's cooperation, 
11 his indication (inaudible) cooperation, that a refiling would 
12 be inappropriate in this particular matter. 
13 THE COURT: And that is the basis of my ruling. 
14 I'm not going to make any restrictions about when the State 
15 can refile because I'm not in a position to be reviewing 
16 that. The prosecution knows the law, knows case law that 
17 applies and knows statutes and rules that apply that you can 
18 refile, but only under certain circumstances and given the 
19 underlying basis of why I'm granting the Motion to Dismiss is 
20 in fact Mr. Fleming's non-appearance today and it's now 10 
21 minutes to 2:00. I simply am not going to make any orders 
22 that would say that if that's refiled again by 5:00 because 
23 then that's putting pressure on the refiling without taking 
24 into consideration that you still don't have that witness. 
25 I If that changes and you do and the State feels like it can go 
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ahead and refile this case in full good faith, that you can 
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moment? (Inaudln^e) record to the state, I was retained by 
Mr. Ceron and -
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THE COURT: Certainly that and the retain - i t was 
a r^tiiner, i pi i v P~ ^  retainer, rmr a conflict? 
MR. SLEIGHT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank yen i. I appreciate your placing 
that on the recoro. Prosecution notes 'who the attorneys are 
and certainly again, I haven't made a restriction on the 
State If they do go pursuant to warrants but certainly J: a 
courtesy let the attorneys who have entered an appearance on 
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1 this case know that there is a refiling, that's appropriate 
2 as well. Okay? 
3 MR. SLEIGHT: Your Honor, in that regard, I do have 
4 a good working address for my client and if the State felt so 
5 inclined I would appreciate proceeding with some as if there 
6 were - I realize you're not restricting them and they're not 
7 bound but nonetheless, I know where he is and we can get him 
8 here on a summons. 
9 THE COURT: And it's appropriate that that be 
10 reflected on the record. It is pursuant to the - because of 
11 the nature of these offenses that I am not making that 
12 restriction. Every case, we look at the facts and the 
13 underlying circumstances as to whether it's appropriate to go 
14 by warrant or by summons. The State is aware of what these 
15 circumstances are and now it's even been placed on the record 
16 that both attorneys would be able to get ahold of their 
17 witnesses, excuse me, of their defendants upon a refiling and 
18 so you may pursue that as you wish. You've had the benefit 
19 of the record but again, I'm not going to make that part of 
20 my order. 
21 MR. SLEIGHT: Thank you for your time, Your Honor. 
22 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Anything else that we need to address? 
24 Thank you. 
25 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) -c-
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2 JUDGE ANN BOYDEN 
3 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: State vs. Pacheco Ortega. Is Mr. 
7 Pacheco Ortega here and present? 
8 MR. PETERSON: He is, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: He's in custody and co-defendant in 
10 this matter is Mr. Luis Ceron. It's my understanding that 
11 Mr. Ceron was not transported because of the federal hold. 
12 MR. SLEIGHT: That's my understanding as well, Your 
13 Honor, and we would waive his appearance for purposes of this 
14 hearing. 
15 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Monty 
16 Sleight is here representing Mr. Ceron. Mr. Peterson here 
17 representing Mr. Pacheco-Ortego who is coming into the 
18 courtroom right now being seated at counsel table. We also 
19 have the interpreter to assist Mr. Pacheco-Ortego and Mr. 
20 Aaron Flater is here representing the State on this matter. 
21 This matter was put on my calendar a couple of 
22 weeks ago at the request of defense counsel for a Brickey 
23 hearing. I also received just before the noon hour I think 
24 today, a motion from Mr. Peterson. I assume that it really 
25 is anticipated that this motion and the Brickey hearing will 
1 be with reference to both defendants, even though the Motion 
2 to Quash the Information is in the name of Pacheco Ortego, 
3 defendant only. Am I correct in understanding that we are at 
4 least dealing with these issues with both co-defendants? 
5 MR. SLEIGHT: Your Honor, we would join in the 
6 motions submitted by co-defendant's counsel. 
7 THE COURT: All right, thank you. And Mr. Flater, 
8 were you able to get a copy of the defense motion before 
9 today's hearing? 
10 MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I got one through the 
11 email at approximately 11:00 this morning from Mr. Peterson. 
12 So I do have a copy of that and he also hand delivered a copy 
13 to me in court today. 
14 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Both of the 
15 motions are similar and overlapping issues and so I am not 
16 giving the benefit of the record to Mr. Peterson since you're 
17 the one who filed it and Pacheco Ortega is here and present 
18 today. I'll let you proceed and then Mr. Sleight can add 
19 anything to the motion that he wishes. Thank you. 
20 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. Your Honor, I 
21 filed the initial Motion to Quash Information asking the 
22 Court to dismiss the case back on April 14 and then I 
23 subsequently filed an accompanying memorandum supporting that 
24 motion today. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. That is what it was. Did I 
have the initial motion? 
MR. PETERSON: I hope you did. It was in the 
original file and I filed it in front of Judge Skanchy when 
the case came back on for roll call. 
THE COURT: Okay. So that has been filed earlier. 
It was just the — 
MR. PETERSON: The motion was filed far in advance. 
The memorandum was filed today. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PETERSON: And the basis for the Motion to 
Quash and Dismiss is articulated in the motion itself dated 
April 14. I've not seen the pleadings from the State or from 
co-defense counsel but I assume the Court is fairly well 
appraised of the issues at play based on what I filed both in 
terms of the motion and the accompanying memorandum. I'm 
also hoping that the Court has had a chance to review the 
original preliminary hearing transcript which is dated April 
2, 2009 when we appeared before Your Honor at 1:30 for an 
evidentiary witness preliminary hearing. The State could not 
go forward because Mr. Fleming was absent. The Court did 
grant our Motion to Dismiss at that time indicating it was 
granted without prejudice with leave of the State to refile 
and then there was a lengthy discussion between various 
counsel and Your Honor about what the State would need to 
adhere to in terms of the appropriate due process and the 
1 appropriate care prior to refiling the information in a case 
2 that had been dismissed for lack of a witness. 
3 So basically Judge, it's our two-pronged position 
4 that number one, the information should not have been filed 
5 unless it came back before Your Honor for review under State 
6 vs. Brickey. I think Brickey is clear that that's the 
7 procedure that needs to be followed for due process purposes, 
8 particularly in a case like this where we have had three 
9 different preliminary hearings scheduled for Mr. Pacheco 
10 Ortego and Mr. Ceron. 
11 The first two of those hearings, Judge, as I 
12 articulated in the memo were continued because of issues that 
13 Mr. Fleming, the principle witness, victim in the State's 
14 case had with regard to his own pending felony charges. He 
15 needed to consult with counsel. At that very first 
16 preliminary hearing I basically conceded that the State would 
17 need some additional time although I put on the record that 
18 Mr. Pacheco Ortego was objecting to the continuance. He 
19 wanted the hearing to go forward at that time. And the same 
20 was true as of the second preliminary hearing scheduled on 
21 February 26th of 2009. Again we couldn't go forward because 
22 Mr. Fleming, the State's witness/victim had the pending case, 
23 had an additional need to consult with counsel and we weren't 
24 able to go forward. Mr. Flater was newly assigned to the 
25 case taking over from Chris Bohn. So there was a little bit 
1 of confusion in that regard but nonetheless, we continued a 
2 second time, again because of Mr. Fleming's ongoing felony 
3 I matter and then that brought us to the preliminary hearing 
4 I date as that I previously indicated, on April 2 before Your 
5 Honor and again we couldn't go forward because Mr. Fleming on 
6 that occasion wasn't present although his assigned defense 
7 lawyer was and we made a record about the notice that he had 
8 been given and it was an in-court declaration and State's 
9 counsel had advised him, his own counsel had advised him; 
10 nonetheless, he was absent. 
11 So, Judge, our position is that under State vs. 
12 Brickey, we basically had a dismissal because the State did 
13 not have sufficient evidence to go forward and because of 
14 that, there are requirements under Brickey and under the due 
15 process clause of the state constitution that the State then 
16 has to comply with before a refiling is appropriate. 
17 My understanding is that the assigned prosecutor in 
18 the case, in fact, refiled the information on the very 
19 afternoon of the day that you dismissed the case on the basis 
20 of a phone call that the prosecutor's office had with Mr. 
21 Fleming's mother who is out-of-state. What I was told by the 
22 assigned prosecutor is that the mother said she would be in 
23 touch with Mr. Fleming. She expected to be in touch with him 
24 in the next few days after that court date that I'm referring 
25 to and, of course, the State asked her to have Mr. Fleming 
1 call so they could be in touch with him and talk about his 
2 non-appearance and further scheduling. But it was that 
3 communication that formed a basis for the refiling of the 
4 criminal informations against my client and Mr. Sleight's 
5 client and co-defense counsel's joint position is that that 
6 is not sufficient under Brickey. There's got to be a lot 
7 more contact, a lot more communication, much more 
8 substantial, meaningful communications between the state and 
9 this missing witness before the refiling is appropriate, not 
10 some indication from a mother that she might hear from her 
11 son. 
12 So that's why Mr. Sleight and I took exception to 
13 the refiling based on our understanding of those particular 
14 facts and particularly in light of what the Court had pretty 
15 carefully articulated on the afternoon of April 2 about the 
16 concerns that Your Honor had about refiling absent, you know, 
17 very significant change of circumstances and I think what 
18 that meant was, you better have a good discussion with Mr. 
19 Fleming about where he was, why he wasn't there and his 
20 intentions to go forward on this and a commitment in that 
21 regard before there's a refiling and we simply didn't have 
22 that or anything approximating that when this information was 
23 I refiled. 
24 THE COURT: I'm going to let the State fully 
25 respond but Mr. Peterson, before you complete this initial 
argument and statement, what were the circumstances that you 
got the information that there was going to be a refiling and 
that it was based on what you are alleging was this 
conversation? Did you receive that information from Mr. 
Flater? Was there a phone call before or after the refiling? 
How did you receive the circumstances that they were going to 
be refiling upon that conversation? 
MR. PETERSON: As you indicated, Your Honor, 
directly from Mr. Flater. He picked up the phone after he 
had talked with Mr. Fleming's mother out-of-state and 
informed me that based on these communications and assurances 
from the mother, that the State was refiling that day. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PETERSON: So that's how I learned about that. 
THE COURT: When you received that phone call did 
you have further discussion on whether or not you thought 
that was enough substance? Did you have that discussion with 
Mr. Flater that you didn't think that was sufficient change 
in circumstance? 
MR. PETERSON: Yes Judge, both on the phone I had 
that discussion with Mr. Flater and also in the lobby of this 
courthouse after your dismissal order was in place, I was 
downstairs talking with Trish Cassel about another pending 
felony matter and Mr. Flater asked a question about case 
authority on point relative to refiling. My response to Mr. 
1 Flater was, well, I think, you know, there's nothing 100 
2 percent on point with the direct facts of our case but the 
3 Brickey issue would be the relevant issue the court would 
4 have to look at and then with Mr. Flater called me that 
5 afternoon, I again said, well, if that's the basis for the 
6 refiling then we'll be filing the appropriate Brickey 
7 objections. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And before I 
9 let the State fully respond. Mr. Sleight do you wish to add 
10 anything to that argument so that Mr. Flater can respond so 
11 he'll know what both attorneys are arguing? 
12 MR. SLEIGHT: Let me begin by responding to the 
13 questions the Court had for Mr. Peterson. I received the 
14 information that the state was proceeding against Mr. Ceron 
15 by voice mail. I was left a voice mail. I responded as 
16 quickly as I could but ended up leaving a voice mail to Mr. 
17 Flater indicating that as Mr. Peterson indicated to him as 
18 well, that I felt that the conversation with Mr. Fleming's 
19 mother was less than adequate, shall we say, to proceed under 
20 the Brickey standard and that I felt that more importantly 
21 than that, I felt it was a violation of the court's order in 
22 this particular matter, that the Court in my view, in my 
23 opinion, was very explicit with the State and the State 
24 expressed an interest in refiling and very, in my view again, 
25 politely tried to explain to the State the necessity of 
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1 having a very solid indication that Mr. Fleming was available 
2 and present and cooperative and would cooperate and testify 
3 in this particular matter. In fact, if I might, looking at 
4 the transcript, the most salient part to me unfortunately, 
5 it's a question that I've put forth to the Court so I'll have 
6 to quote myself and I apologize for that but the statement 
7 that I made to the Court was I think the Court - this is on 
8 Page 7 of the transcript, very bottom, "I think the Court was 
9 very clear in granting our request and I'm hoping this will 
10 be reflected in the Court's order that absent Mr. Fleming's 
11 cooperation and some indication of Mr. Fleming's cooperation, 
12 that a refiling would be inappropriate in this particular 
13 matter." The Court's response was, "And that is my, that is 
14 the basis of my ruling." I don't think the Court could have 
15 been any more clear with the State in this particular matter. 
16 I've expressed a great deal of frustration to 
17 several people about - not just in this case, but the State's 
18 practice of refiling after preliminary hearing as a general 
19 rule. The courts I think have repeatedly tried to emphasize 
20 with the State the importance of Brickey, the importance of 
21 complying with the evidentiary requirements of Brickey, but 
22 more than that also the importance of proceeding by summons 
23 I when appropriate, not that the court issued that order in 
24 this particular case but the State, and I'm not faulting Mr. 
25 Flater for this, but the State routinely ignores those orders 
from the court and I've been on the wrong side of that, 
trying to explain that to people on numerous occasions and 
the only way that I can see that the State is going to get 
the message is in a case like this for the Court to dismiss 
this matter and to dismiss it with prejudice. I think that 
what happened here and I mean, I hate to use the words 
prosecutorial misconduct because they spark so much animosity 
and that's not what I'm trying to do here. I think that this 
is perhaps based on an office-wide perception at the current 
District Attorney's Office, perhaps based solely on Mr. 
Flater's perception, but I think what happens when we hear 
the words prosecutorial misconduct, we want to assume some 
foul intent on the part of the prosecutors. So let me be 
very clear that I don't fault the motive for Mr. Flater 
refiling this matter. I understand the motive for Mr. Flater 
refiling this matter, the nature of the charges, the 
allegations against Mr. Ceron are serious, some of the most 
serious that can be filed by the State. So his motive and 
his belief and his idea of protecting our society, I 
understand that motive and in fact sympathize with it but 
prosecutorial misconduct and bad faith is not - like we tell 
juries all the time, let's not confuse motive with intent. 
His intent in this matter was to refile and he did so, in my 
view in blatant disregard of the Court's order. The Court's 
order was very specific, unusually specific in this 
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1 particular case, that we needed Mr. Fleming and we needed his 
2 cooperation. And in subsequent conversations with Mr. Flater, 
3 some of which unfortunately were probably more heated than 
4 they needed to be on my side, and I apologize for that. In 
5 those conversations Mr. Flater has indicated that they still 
6 have had no contact with Mr. Fleming and that Mr. Fleming is 
7 still unlocatable and I put in a call this morning to Mr. 
8 Hall who represents Mr. Fleming. He's had no contact with 
9 Mr. Fleming. I don't think the Court or defense counsel 
10 could have done any more to explain to the State that filing 
11 under these circumstances was inappropriate and that I think 
12 is what crosses the line, that's where we cross that line and 
13 we have again, I hate the words, but it's prosecutorial 
14 misconduct. It violates an important part of the 
15 prosecutor's role. Yes, the prosecutor's responsibility is 
16 to protect our society but a prosecutor's responsibility is 
17 also to protect due process and to protect the constitution. 
18 This case is not just about Luis Ceron. That's not the only 
19 thing this case is about. The Brickey decision was not just 
20 about the defendant in that matter. This is about the 
21 process and making sure that the process is fair and 
22 appropriate and we don't have a situation where people sit in 
23 a jail cell on a second refiling because the court - or 
24 because the state did not go to the original magistrate and 
25 try to refile in front of the original magistrate and we have 
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1 people sitting in jail cells for weeks on end until we can 
2 finally arrange through our system, and our system, I'm a 
3 believer in our system, Judge; it's as good as they get out 
4 there but it has flaws and this is one of them and this is 
5 one of the flaws that Brickey was designed to prevent. We 
6 have people sitting in jail cells waiting to get a lawyer 
7 appointed because they can't afford one or trying to postpone 
8 it a second time because the state has refiled by warrant or, 
9 you know, we have all of these injustices that Brickey was 
10 designed to prevent and the only way Brickey functions is if 
11 it has teeth and teeth in the law is the word prejudice, 
12 dismiss with prejudice and that's what we're asking for in 
13 this matter, Your Honor. Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: There are a couple of other questions 
15 that I want to address before Mr. Flater responds because it 
16 may make a difference in part of his response too. There are 
17 two different things that I'm looking to, not only the 
18 prosecutions good faith in refiling this but also prejudice 
19 that was done to either of the defendants. So just for my 
20 information, are other matters still holding Mr. Pacheco 
21 Ortego at this time? 
22 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, the principle other 
23 matter that has been holding him throughout the duration of 
24 the case and it was basically a hold that was contemporaneous 
25 with the hold in this case is the immigration hold. And that 
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1 has not expired. He had a couple of minor infraction tickets 
2 that he had to clear up. He has done that but, but for this 
3 case and this filing, the immigration hold, I mean, he would 
4 have been processed and long gone by now either released back 
5 into the United States to live with his family or not. 
6 That's a matter of a separate deportation hearing. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you. And Mr. Ceron's situation, 
8 I understand there was a federal hold and that's why he's not 
9 here today. 
10 MR. SLEIGHT: That is the case, Your Honor. That 
11 federal hold is still in existence. Immediately upon the 
12 dismissal in this particular matter, we sought a new hearing 
13 to discuss Mr. Ceron's custody status which hearing was 
14 cancelled essentially because of the refiling in this 
15 particular matter. It's our impression and our belief in 
16 working with Mr. Ceron's federal attorney, that there was a 
17 substantial chance that he might be eligible and might 
18 qualify for a federal release given the nature of the charges 
19 in the federal court. Unlike the normal circumstance where 
20 the State is usually waiting to see what the feds do, this is 
21 a situation where the feds have been waiting to see what the 
22 state does. The charges that he's facing federal court 
23 J thought somewhat serious, are not those that would normally 
24 prohibit his release to federal pretrial services and would 
25 not normally prohibit his ability to be placed on federal 
13 
probation. Mr. Ceron is a United States citizen, so there 
aren't any immigration concerns with Mr. Ceron's situation. 
Initially the basis for the feds issuing a no release in his 
federal case was this case. They explicitly stated on the 
record that because of the state case they weren't 
comfortable with the release on his federal case. They 
initially had concerns about his immigration status but once 
it was demonstrated he was a citizen, they backed away from 
that. 
THE COURT: All right. And my reading today the 
transcript of the last hearing we had when I dismissed this 
matter without prejudice because Mr. Fleming was not present 
at that time, both attorneys gave me not in as much detail, 
but basically the same responses as to what if anything else 
were holding each of the two defendants in custody at the 
time. I had basically that same information at the time of 
that hearing. Anything significantly changed from then, and 
it sounds to me like other than because this was refiled, 
that those two different processing tracks did not occur, is 
that correct? 
MR. SLEIGHT: That's correct. 
THE COURT: They're still being held on the 
immigration hold and Mr. Ceron is still on the federal given 
those foundational statements. 
MR. SLEIGHT: Yes. 
14 
1 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Flater, what would you 
2 like me to know? 
3 MR. FLATER: Thank you, Your Honor. As Mr. Sleight 
4 pointed out, the State is extremely concerned about these 
5 cases. I want to provide a little bit of a factual 
6 background to help understand and explain the State' s actions 
7 in this case. The victim, Michael Fleming, reported that he 
8 was brutally beaten, kicked, stomped on, tasered, hog tied, 
9 threatened with guns, one of which was shoved down his throat 
10 to the point that he passed out. A rag was then shoved in 
11 his mouth secured by duct tape and he was stuffed in the back 
12 in the trunk of a car while he listened to his attackers 
13 planning the best way to kill him and dispose of his body. 
14 Now these reports were not just reported by Mr. Fleming. 
15 They were also corroborated by the police officers who saved 
16 his life by showing up, pulling him out of the trunk, seeing 
17 that he had been severely beaten and additionally the police 
18 found the defendants present at the scene of the attack. 
19 Now that factual backdrop explains the State's 
20 great concern and interest in this case and great concern in 
21 J attempting to retain custody over these defendants who have 
22 been accused of perpetrating this very horrendous crime and 
23 J as counsel for defense, for the defendants both candidly 
24 admitted today and they expressed at the last hearing, there 
25 was, if not a probability, at least a significant likelihood 
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1 that if this case were dismissed and not to be refiled, there 
2 was a distinct likelihood that both of these defendants would 
3 then be released and if that were to happen the State might 
4 face the very real risk that the defendants wouldn't be here 
5 to answer to those charges today. That explains some of the, 
6 I guess, the expeditious manner in which the State chose to 
7 refile these particular cases, because of the concerns that 
8 were articulated at the last hearing and the hearing today. 
9 I also want to discuss the procedural history 
10 leading up to the last preliminary hearing and the dismissal. 
11 The victim, Michael Fleming, has been personally served by 
12 our office three times and on those three occasions, came to 
13 court every single time. There was a juvenile preliminary 
14 hearing on November 19, 2008 for the two juvenile co-
15 defendants. Mr. Fleming was served and showed up at that 
16 hearing. The other two prior preliminary hearings for these 
17 particular defendants, Mr. Fleming was personally served and 
18 showed up both times. 
19 Now as Mr. Peterson articulated earlier, there was 
20 a concern, I think initially brought up by Mr. Peterson that 
21 this particular witness - and I think it was an appropriate 
22 concern that Mr. Peterson brought up - that this witness 
23 might need to have counsel appointed and so the first 
24 preliminary hearing was continued not at the request of the 
25 State but on behalf of the victim of this case who needed 
16 
1 counsel. 
2 The second time - and I need to correct one thing, 
3 I was not here at the second preliminary hearing. The first 
4 time that I personally handled this case was at the third 
5 preliminary hearing in which the case was dismissed but at 
6 the second preliminary hearing, my understanding is in 
7 speaking with the attorneys involved, was that Mr. Fleming 
8 was here and present once again, being personally served, but 
9 that his own attorney, Mr. Hall, was not prepared to advise 
10 him at that time and requested a continuance of that hearing 
11 at that time. 
12 THE COURT: I'm going to interrupt just to I am 
13 clear. Was he in custody at the time or had he come per 
14 subpoena that second time when we appointed Mr. Hall? He was 
15 out of custody and was coming in on subpoena, so the material 
16 witness warrant or the transport order to get him here while 
17 he was in jail was not involved in that second preliminary 
18 hearing? 
19 MR. FLATER: That's correct. And that brings us to 
20 the third preliminary - well, up to that point the State had 
21 a very good track record, there was no basis for a material 
22 witness warrant. All three times that he'd personally been 
23 served, he'd come to court every time. The preliminary 
24 hearing at which the case was dismissed because he was not 
25 here, Mr. Fleming was not personally served. That was - he 
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had been in custody prior to the preliminary hearing. The 
State requested a transport order and the transport order was 
in place. Approximately 24 hours prior to the preliminary 
hearing I received actual notice from my secretary that we 
had been notified that he would not be transported because he 
was no longer in custody and I believe he did get out before 
that point, at some time before that point and somebody from 
the state had knowledge of that, whoever was handling his 
case. I personally didn't have knowledge that he had been 
released and in those 24 hours we attempted personal service 
on Mr. Fleming, but given the very short time period, we were 
unable to locate him and personally serve him prior to the 
April 2nd preliminary hearing. 
And it is accurate that shortly after the dismissal 
at the preliminary hearing, I personally received a phone 
call from an investigator with the District Attorney's Office 
who indicated that he had located Michael Fleming's mother 
and brother, had established contact with them. He spoke 
with Michael Fleming's mother. 
THE COURT: This was before the preliminary hearing. 
or after? 
MR. FLATER: No, this was after, after the 
dismissal, in fact shortly after. I took the call out in the 
hallway after leaving the courtroom. Our investigator 
informed me that he had spoken with Michael Fleming's mother 
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1 on the telephone, that she and Michael Fleming's brother were 
2 living in Montana, that she had been in contact with him, 
3 that he was here in the Salt Lake area and that she expected 
4 to hear from him shortly because he was going to borrow money 
5 from her and they needed to make arrangements for her to get 
6 the money to him and transfer that money to him. She told 
7 our investigator at that time that when he contacted her that 
8 she would in turn contact our investigator and give him the 
9 information for Mr. Fleming so that we could speak with him. 
10 Since that time our investigators from our office 
11 have spoken again with Mr. Fleming's brother. As far as I 
12 know, we have not yet heard from his mother again, but his 
13 brother who lives with his mother has been in contact with 
14 Mr. Fleming. He also indicated that Mr. Fleming was still 
15 here in the Salt Lake area and that he had contact with him 
16 and was able to relay messages from our investigator through 
17 his brother to Michael. So there has been indirect contact. 
18 Nobody from our office has directly spoken with Michael 
19 Fleming but through his family members there has been 
20 indirect communication at that point. Well, and some of that 
21 happened after the decision to refile had been made, namely 
22 the communication with his brother where messages were 
23 I exchanged. 
24 As far as Mr. Fleming's cooperation, up to that 
25 point Mr. Fleming has shown every indication of being 
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1 available and being present until the time that we weren't 
2 able to serve him. I do think that he had previously been in 
3 court when the preliminary hearing was set but probably did 
4 not have anything on paper telling him he needed to come back 
5 to court that day. It may have just been an oversight. Even 
6 if Mr. Fleming is semi-cooperative or uncooperative, the 
7 State believes that it would be able to locate Mr. Fleming, 
8 that we have good information to be able to track him down 
9 for a number of different reasons. Number one, he's released 
10 to pretrial services currently. He is scheduled for a 
11 sentencing on his own case on April 24 and after that 
12 presumably because it's a felony case, he will either be in 
13 custody or on probation with Adult Probation and Parole. 
14 There's a lot of, I guess, reasons to believe that the State 
15 will be able to find and locate Mr. Fleming and if necessary 
16 I serve a material witness warrant if he is not willing to 
17 respond to personal service. 
18 And Your Honor, I would submit that those facts and 
19 all of those circumstances would be enough in and of 
20 themselves to justify the State's refiling and indicate that 
21 the State's refiling of this case was done in good faith. 
22 But I don't think the analysis even needs to end there. Even 
23 without Mr. Fleming's availability, the State would still 
24 refile this case. Mr. Fleming was the witness that the State 
25 was counting on to adduce evidence at the preliminary hearing 
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1 but if he became unavailable, the State - there are other 
2 avenues that the State could proceed through to prosecute the 
3 defendants Pacheco Ortega and Ceron. Those being, there were 
4 other - some of the physical evidence that was collected at 
5 the scene, other witnesses, possibly co-defendants in the 
6 case. There have been preliminary discussions with attorneys 
7 for the juvenile co-defendants and although there is no 
8 agreement in place, there was an expressed desire to discuss 
9 the possibility of having those individuals testify on behalf 
10 of the State and so the State believes that there would be, 
11 even absent Mr. Fleming, that there would be sufficient 
12 evidence through which the State could go again to a 
13 preliminary hearing and proceed in a case against the 
14 defendants at trial. 
15 I I next wanted to address the legal arguments that 
16 have been addressed here. The defendants have cited Brickey 
17 as the case that controls here. I would submit to the Court 
18 that another case that is more closely analogous and that is 
19 the case of State vs. Atensio, 89 P Third D-191 which is a 
20 case that comes after Brickey, clarifies and distinguishes 
21 Brickey. In Atensio, the court recognized and emphasized the 
22 distinction between those cases dismissed for insufficient 
23 I evidence where a preliminary hearing was held but the 
24 prosecutor didn't put on enough evidence and distinguished it 
25 between those that were just dismissed due to an inability of 
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1 the prosecution to proceed which is what we have here. And 
2 in Atensio, the first preliminary hearing was continued 
3 because the State needed additional time to get a toxicology 
4 report. At the second setting the prosecutor did not have 
5 her file and was unable to go forward and the court 
6 dismissed. The prosecutor then refiled. There was a Brickey 
7 challenge made and the court declined to extend Brickey to 
8 those cases in which there as no evidence taken and there was 
9 no evidence of bad faith or misconduct of the prosecutor. 
10 Your Honor, I believe that's what controls in this situation. 
11 I have a copy of that case for the Court if you would like a 
12 copy of State vs. Atencio. 
13 Another case that's after Brickey, State vs. 
14 Morgan, 34 P Third D-767, clarifies, once again clarifies 
15 Brickey and explains Brickey, narrows the holding and 
16 clarifies that when abusive practices are not involved, 
17 there's no presumptive bar to refiling. And the court 
18 determined in that case the prosecutor was not engaged in 
19 misconduct but simply made an innocent miscalculation in the 
20 evidence necessary and the (inaudible) court even 
21 acknowledged and they stated that the criminal justice system 
22 inconveniences defendants and being in custody can be 
23 harassing and oppressive from the defendant's viewpoint but 
24 that's not the controlling factor. The controlling factor is 
25 the due process concerns and those due process concerns 
22 
(inaudible) in Brickey focus on the bad faith and misconduct 
• :>f prosecutors. 
And finally , State vs. Zane or Zahn, Z-A-H-N. The 
Court of Appeals reiterated that tlle Brickey rule is a very 
narrow one and failed 
evidence of abusive p 
Your Honor, 
case, the procedural 
to find a violation of Brickey absent 
ractices. 
1 submit based on the facts of the 
history and the legal - the case law, 
1
 that the State did appropriately refile this case and I would 
ask the Court to make a finding that the State did i lot engage 
in practices that were in bad faith or abusive in this 
particular case, but 
justifiable reasons f 
circumstances. Does 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Fleming. Was he 
plea for which he was 
plea offer made based 
that the State had good reason and 
or refiling this case in these 
the Court have any questions? 
Just a couple on the current status of 
given a plea bargain in this change of 
waiting for the sentencing? Was that a 
in part on his cooperation in 
testifying in this case as far as you know? 
MR. FLATER: 




since his failure to 
I don't believe so. If that was, I'm 
Are you the prosecutor in that case? 
I'm not the prosecutor in that case. 
Is there a bench warrant out for him 
appear for that sentencing and that 
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1 presentence process? 
2 MR. FLATER: Not yet because he has not failed to 
3 appear for sentencing. The sentencing is scheduled for April 
4 24th. 
5 THE COURT: Has he gone into AP&P and done the 
6 presentence process? 
7 MR. FLATER: He did not go into AP&P for his 
8 presentence interview. 
9 THE COURT: And he's not responding to pretrial on 
10 a regular basis and reporting to them? 
11 MR. FLATER: I checked with pretrial and he has 
12 checked in with pretrial on a couple of different occasions 
13 since his release. They haven't been regular but on at least 
14 two or three dates he has checked in with them. I don't have 
15 those dates with me but they indicated that he has called in 
16 and checked in a couple of different times with them. 
17 THE COURT: So with the information from Mr. 
18 Fleming's mother and brother, that Mr. Fleming is in the Salt 
19 Lake area and is actually reporting to pretrial, you and your 
20 investigators have not been able to get him in here? 
21 J MR. FLATER: Well, Your Honor, at this point there 
22 is nothing - I can't send an investigator out to pick him up 
23 because there is nothing to bring him in on. I could serve 
24 him a subpoena but there's no court date to have him 
25 subpoenaed to appear at and I'm confident that if we seek and 
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get a material witness warrant, that we will be able to 
locate him. We have a lot of information about his contacts, 
addresses and so forth but there is nothing that currently 
compels him to come before the court. If the court in his 
underlying case issues a warrant, then I think our 
investigators would be able to go out and bring him in if 
necessary but at this point there's nothing that we can do to 
exercise jurisdiction over him until, if and until we get a 
material witness warrant or there's another warrant 
outstanding for his arrest. 
THE COURT: Are you aware of how many times and a 
regular basis bench warrants are issued for failure to report 
to pretrial on a regular basis or for pretrial revocation or 
for failing to appear for the presentence process? No 
warrants or even a revocation of pretrial has been sought on 
those minimal issues with Mr. Fleming. You're just waiting 
until he fails to appear for sentencing before you feel that 
you can get any documentation to take him into custody? Is 
that what you're arguing to me, Mr. Flater? 
MR. FLATER: Well, Your Honor, I guess I have to 
admit that there's different levels of prosecution in our 
office. I am not involved in prosecuting Mr. Fleming. I'm 
seeking him as a witness and I personally have not made an 
attempt to interfere with his case — 
THE COURT: Okay. That was the extent - that was 
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1 my question and that's what I wanted to know. I appreciate 
2 that. 
3 MR. FLATER: And Your Honor, even as I expressed 
4 earlier, even without Mr. Fleming, I believe the State would 
5 have made the decision to refile this case because there is 
6 other justification for refiling, other reasons to believe 
7 that the State could proceed with a preliminary hearing. We 
8 didn't have those witnesses subpoenaed for the prior 
9 preliminary hearing simply because we expected Mr. Fleming to 
10 be here. He had a good track record of being here and we 
11 thought that we would be able to proceed with his testimony 
12 and again at the preliminary hearing level, it's very common 
13 for the State not to present its entire case and bring in all 
14 of its witnesses and that's exactly what happened here. It 
15 was almost a one strike and you're out with this particular 
16 instance with Mr. Fleming. One no show, and we were done. 
17 But with the track record and the history of getting him 
18 here, being able to contact him, we believe not only can we 
19 get him here but that if we don't get him here that we can 
20 still go forward. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. Response, both Mr. Peterson 
22 and Mr. Sleight may respond. 
23 I MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, procedurally, do you 
24 anticipate asking for additional briefing from the state 
25 particularly with regard Atencio, Morgan and Zahn? 
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1 THE COURT: I'm very familiar with Morgan, familiar 
2 with Brickey, familiar with Redd. Atencio I have seen 
3 referred to and Mr. Flater's references to it were the ones 
4 that - I'm not anticipating further briefing. 
5 MR. PETERSON: Mr. Sleight and I could go on for 35 
6 minutes about why those cases are inapplicable here and 
7 beside the point. They really don't pertain to the core 
8 issue — 
9 THE COURT: The bad faith. 
10 MR. PETERSON: - here which is the District 
11 Attorney's Office refiling this case without the appropriate 
12 basis under Brickey, end of story, period. 
13 THE COURT: That's the issue before me today and I 
14 am ruling on that issue today. 
15 MR. PETERSON: So Your Honor, without belaboring 
16 all of that other authority and distinguishing it, Mr. 
17 Flater's response has a great deal of speculation built into 
18 it about well, we might do this or we might have this 
19 contact. That's not the analysis. The analysis is when you 
20 refile the criminal information that then re-held these co-
21 defendants what did you know then? Did you comply with 
22 Brickey and as Mr. Sleight articulated so well, did you 
23 comply with Your Honor's order and admonitions about the care 
24 the State needed to adhere to before that refiling occurred 
25 and it's our joint submission that the State simply did not. 
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1 They didn't comply with Brickey, they didn't comply with the 
2 court order and it's on that basis that we're seeking the 
3 dismissal. 
4 The other thing that's so frustrating about this 
5 just to give a little bit of a back story since that's what 
6 Mr. Flater was about procedurally is that Mr. Sleight and I 
7 attempted numerous times to try and negotiate resolution for 
8 our clients at the earlier settings by accessing Mr. Fleming 
9 and he shut us down cold. What's so significant about that 
10 Judge is — 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Fleming? 
12 MR. PETERSON: Mr. Fleming. What's so significant 
13 about that and Mr. Bohn would readily acknowledge this if he 
14 were present, that in all of the discovery, in all of the 
15 police reports, in all of the statements that Mr. Fleming 
16 gave to law enforcement, he doesn't indicate that Mr. Pacheco 
17 Ortega did anything at all, never laid a finger on him. Mr. 
18 Pacheco Ortega is an auto mechanic at this shop. When Mr. 
19 Fleming showed up that day at the request of one of the twins 
20 who are in juvenile court, Mr. Ortega met Mr. Fleming at the 
21 door and they walked together back to an office area of the 
22 shop and then all hell broke loose. I mean Mr. Fleming was 
23 significantly assaulted and he indicates in his statement 
24 that the two twins, who the State now thinks they'd like to 
25 seek cooperation on, were kicking him and beating him and 
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duct taping him and putting him in the truck of a car. One 
of the twins was holding a gun. And likewise, I don't mean 
to under cut Mr. Sleight's position here, but Mr. Ceron then 
gets involved and does some things of his own. But Judge, 
you know, we have these preliminary hearing settings so we 
can get witnesses in and talk to them, see what we can do and 
Mr. Fleming won't talk to us. All I want to do is ask him 
one question, in your police statements, you never indicate 
my client does anything to you so tell me right now, with Mr. 
Bohn, with Mr. Flater sitting here, what did my client do? I 
think the answer is nothing and here we are again at a third 
preliminary hearing and post third preliminary hearing where 
I'm trying to get this case expedited for Mr. Pacheco Ortega 
and I can't largely because of Mr. Fleming. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Sleight? 
MR. SLEIGHT: Just, trying to think how many law 
enforcement agencies there are in Salt Lake Valley, coupled 
with how many investigators work for the District Attorney, 
coupled with their close relationship with pretrial services, 
coupled with their relationship with the jail and I will 
point out one thing for the Court, Mr. Hall was here and 
represented to the Court that while his plea bargain may not 
have been a result of any cooperation, his release from 
custody certainly was. 
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1 THE COURT: That was placed on the record. 
2 MR. SLEIGHT: That was all on the record and it 
3 just boggles my mind that here we are today at a hearing and 
4 the State hasn't really even made any real effort to contact 
5 Mr. Fleming. They've contacted mom, they've contacted 
6 brother, nobody has tried to find him and I'm not saying he 
7 should have been subpoenaed for today's hearing although that 
8 would have resolved things somewhat, but at least talk to him 
9 to at least have talked to him and find out, are you going to 
10 be cooperative in this case? That's the real issue here and 
11 that's what the Court asked the State to do at the last 
12 setting and that's what the Court has failed to do and there 
13 needs to be a consequence for that, Judge. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. 
15 MR. FLATER: Your Honor, may I just briefly respond 
16 to some of the factual issues? 
17 THE COURT: You may. 
18 MR. FLATER: The police report does indicate Mr. 
19 Fleming specifically described the actions of five different 
20 individuals in this case; the actions regarding the 
21 juveniles, Mr. Ceron and then two other individuals, one of 
22 whom he describes as having a taser and the other one as 
23 having a substance similar to pepper spray that sprayed him 
24 with that and he had a burning sensation. Not only that but 
25 I Mr. Pacheco Ortega was the one he described as bringing him 
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1 back into the area where he would have been assaulted by the 
2 other individuals. And so there is a factual basis for the 
3 charges and our concern with Mr. Pacheco Ortega and then 
4 additionally, finally, the State is prepared even if Mr. 
5 Fleming is not cooperative, he doesn't have a right not to 
6 testify in this case and the State is prepared to seek a 
7 material witness warrant, if and when necessary and even if 
8 he's not willing, to bring him in forcefully and ask the 
9 Court to compel him to testify. So there is some indication 
10 that he's not cooperative but there also are mechanisms to 
11 have a recalcitrant witness testify and that's - if it needs 
12 to go to that point, the State will employ those methods. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
14 All right. I find it very interesting that the 
15 State prefaces its argument as to whether or not the refiling 
16 of this, these very, very serious first degree felonies was 
17 in good faith or not with how serious these charges are. I 
18 am acknowledging at the very beginning of my ruling that 
19 these are the most serious, the next to the most serious, I 
20 guess. They are first degree felonies, they are dealing with 
21 serious personal assaultive attacks on human beings. We're 
22 not dealing with property offenses. We are dealing with 
23 I very, very serious offenses and that is what was first and 
24 foremost in my mind when I addressed whether or not it was 
25 fair and just to dismiss these counts without prejudice even 
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1 without prejudice at the last hearing when the State was 
2 unable to go forward. Because Mr. Flater had been here for 
3 the first time I believe, you might have been here on the 
4 I initial hearing but the second time when Mr. Bohn, 
5 Christopher Bohn was the prosecutor, you hadn't been present 
6 and so I knew you were here first time at the last hearing 
7 and that Mr. Fleming had in fact been present at other 
8 hearings. My recollection - and I asked again today - was 
9 not clear on whether or not he was here by subpoena or here 
10 because he had been transported as a witness while he was 
11 still in custody. But he was here and the State had every 
12 indication from Mr. Fleming that they would be able to put on 
13 a preliminary hearing with Mr. Fleming's testimony. It was 
14 continued once. It was continued again and even on the third 
15 time I took into consideration everything that has been 
16 I argued by the State with me today to even determine whether I 
17 was going to dismiss on that third time, precisely because 
18 Mr. Fleming had been available or at least here and ready to 
19 testify and this was the first time that Mr. Fleming was not 
20 present and ready to testify. I determined then that it was 
21 appropriate to dismiss and to dismiss without prejudice 
22 because that still afforded the State the opportunity to 
23 J freely prosecute very, very serious allegations when they 
24 were in a position to go forward with those cases. 
25 I specifically asked Mr. Flater at the time if Mr. 
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1 Fleming was the victim of this case, more than just a 
2 material witness, if he was the one who had borne the brunt 
3 of the beating, the vicious beating and holding the gun in 
4 the mouth and the other allegations that are made in the 
5 probable cause statement because part of my decision was 
6 going to be whether or not other victims had been involved 
7 and whether they were here, whether there were other people 
8 who had suffered at the hands of these allegations, at least 
9 what the allegations were, and my memory - and as I reviewed 
10 the transcript again today, that Mr. Fleming is the victim 
11 here. 
12 I asked Mr. Flater if the State could go forward 
13 without Mr. Fleming's testimony and it was clear that he was 
14 the victim, he was the material witness and the State needed 
15 to have him there to go forward and at that point I 
16 determined even though these were very serious charges and 
17 this was the first time Mr. Flater had been here and this was 
18 the first time Mr. Fleming had not appeared, that a dismissal 
19 without prejudice was appropriate. 
20 At that time - and that's what brings us to this 
21 hearing today and I've given that much foundation because it 
22 is important for everyone to realize what I am balancing 
23 I today. 
24 At that time I made the order that there was to be 
25 a dismissal without prejudice and Mr. Flater stated on the 
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1 record at the time anticipating that kind of ruling, that 
2 I they would immediately refile and at that point I 
3 specifically addressed with Mr. Flater that if they were in a 
4 position, he either showed the paper or stated he had the 
5 paperwork ready and would go immediately outside of my 
6 courtroom and refile this case, that the paperwork was 
7 already ready, I questioned if the State was in a position to 
8 refile why they could not go forward with the preliminary 
9 hearing. That is the basis of refiling, basically you are 
10 stating to the court, you are swearing that you are in a 
11 position to go forward with this case and you were unable to 
12 go forward with the preliminary hearing because you did not 
13 have Mr. Fleming. When you stated you were going to 
14 immediately refile, I asked why you couldn't just do the 
15 preliminary hearing then and we addressed what the State 
16 could refile, that I was not barring refiling but it needed 
17 to be under circumstances where you could go forward with Mr. 
18 Fleming's testimony. The reason again, that I am doing this 
19 and it's in so much detail is because today we are here on 
20 what is called a Brickey hearing. 
21 Brickey is a very old case. It's 1986. I think we 
22 probably have children who are older than that, some of us 
23 anyway, and it has been modified multiple times by Atencio, 
24 by Morgan, by Redd, by some other cases that have been 
25 referred to today and I am very familiar with those cases and 
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1 much of the teeth has been taken out of Brickey as far as 
2 barring the State from refiling because it recognizes the 
3 very, very important right prosecutors have to freely 
4 prosecute terrible crimes or any kind of crimes where they 
5 have the evidence to go forward and prosecute these crimes 
6 but it doesn't negate it to the point where we can't, that 
7 the judge doesn't have to - and I really take that 
8 responsibility seriously - to weigh the prosecution's right 
9 to freely prosecute against very, very important defendant 
10 due process restrictions and my analysis has to involve 
11 prosecutor's good faith, even the new cases still say absent 
12 abusive factors, absent prosecution bad faith, absent the 
13 innocent miscalculation I think is what the phrase is on some 
14 of the newer cases, then the State can refile. 
15 This issue before me today is about as narrow as 
16 I've ever seen it on whether or not Mr. Flater's refiling as 
17 quickly as he did rose to the level of an abuse of practice 
18 and bad faith. I am weighing the factors that Mr. Flater has 
19 explained and that Mr. Peterson has explained that Mr. Flater 
20 did go out and refile the case within a couple of hours based 
21 upon somebody else's contact with Mr. Fleming or based on a 
22 contact with Mr. Fleming's family members but no contact with 
23 Mr. Fleming himself. The refiling occurred before there was 
24 any contact with Mr. Fleming himself. 
25 Even taking into consideration what has happened 
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1 since then is the State chose that they still have not had 
2 any contact with Mr. Fleming himself. They are relying on 
3 other cases that are holding him, presentence orders that are 
4 holding him, pretrial orders that are holding him, family 
5 members saying he's still in the Salt Lake basin but even 
6 when the State is coming to respond to whether or not their 
7 filing was in good faith, they can still not give me any 
8 basis that they have had contact with Mr. Fleming. To now 
9 argue that, well, it doesn't matter if we had any contact 
10 with Mr. Fleming because we can refile on other basis, simply 
11 is not persuasive to me today because 1 specifically 
12 addressed that with the State before I dismissed the case 
13 even without prejudice. I took all of that into 
14 consideration and even then the State told the Court, in 
15 spite of the ruling that she had just made that they were 
16 going to go out and refile this anyway, they had the 
17 paperwork ready and the fact that there was no change in 
18 circumstances, didn't seem to deter them from refiling, to 
19 then argue that going out and making a phone call or having a 
2 0 contact with a family member and not following up anymore is 
21 so minimus that it is even an indication of the bad faith 
22 because I specifically told the State that they would need 
23 contact with Mr. Fleming, they would need to be in a position 
24 to come into this court with that case in tact and if there 
25 was no change in circumstances between when I was dismissing 
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1 it because Mr. Fleming was not present and Mr. Flater said 
2 they could not proceed on that preliminary hearing because 
3 Mr. Fleming was not present, then I find that it was bad 
4 faith on the part of the prosecution to walk out the door and 
5 upon a phone call with a family member that they anticipated 
6 would hear from him and not even following up with any more 
7 attempts'to try and get them, that that rises to the level of 
8 bad faith. 
9 I agree with Mr. Sleight that sometimes legally -
10 sometimes when we hear bad faith, we look at it outside of 
11 the legal parameters and I don't think that Mr. Flater has 
12 tried in any way to not carry out his responsibilities but 
13 the restrictions he had on him are there for a reason and I 
14 specifically addressed him for those reasons and absent the 
15 fact that we had so specifically restricted them and 
16 I addressed those issues already, I might not be finding bad 
.17 faith but when I did address them so specifically, to then 
18 suggest that a simple phone call with a family member with 
19 nothing more is not sufficient good faith. And I agree that 
20 when I balance all of these issues that it seems unfair and 
21 improper to dismiss the case with prejudice, but it was 
22 without prejudice when I was taking all of those factors into 
23 consideration and it is that window of bad faith that means 
24 that the Brickey standard requires that it is precisely under 
25 those circumstances that it cannot be refiled. When the 
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1 State went out and refiled it as quickly as they did with the 
2 emotions that - well, we're just going to refile this anyway 
3 so anything the court does or anything the defense does is 
4 meaningless because this is a horrible act - and it is - and 
5 so we're just going to refile it anyway, is simply the type 
6 of limitations that judicious prosecution cannot pass and I 
7 am not happy with the result of what that means but I don't 
8 think that there is any other way to fairly assess the very 
9 aggressive refiling when the State did not have an adequate 
10 change in circumstances to come forward to the Court and 
11 swear that they could then go forward with the prosecution 
12 before they refiled. They simply refiled without going 
13 | through the necessary process that they needed to. 
14 So I am granting the motion on the part of both of 
15 the co-defendants and dismissing this case pursuant to the 
16 Brickey standard as well as the followup cases that 
17 specifically address abusive factors, find that these factors 
18 do rise to those levels and the information is dismissed 
19 against Mr. Ceron and Mr. Pacheco Ortega. Thank you. 
20 MR. PETERSON: The dismissal is? 
21 THE COURT: With prejudice, it has to be. I think it 
22 has to be. Thank you. Appreciate everyone's work. Thank 
23 you. 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
Joel F. Pacheco-Ortega 
Defendant. 
ORDER DISMISSING INFORMATION 
Case No. 091902778 
JUDGE ANN BOYDEN 
The Court, after hearing oral arguments from both parties, finds that in re-filing 
this case the State violated the standards articulated in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 
(Utah 1986). Wherefore, the Court orders that the information in this case is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this Qjfcday of May, 2009. .. 
o JKIGJNAL 
FILED BI^^r^^CURT 
Third JiiK^Mi 6:*toct 
Deputy Clerk 
